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This paper examines the changing economic environment under globalization and
reviews issues pertaining to international trade and capital flows.  It places emphasis on
the trends, issues, and arguments about regional trade arrangements (RTAs) and foreign
direct investment (FDI) on the ground that these would be the key for Africa in its strategy
to link itself to the global economy. The paper discusses the marginalization of Africa in
the rapidly integrating global economy and its possible explanations. It is shown that
industrial countries have been wide open to Africa’s exports relative to those from other
regions, and that the problem lies on the part of Africa in its restrictive domestic as well as
import (openness) and export policies. The paper considers strategies for linking Africa
to a changing world moving into the 21st century. Necessary reforms on the part of the
African economies, and initiatives that industrialized countries and multilateral institutions
such as the WTO and the World Bank can take are enumerated.RESUME
Ce document, qui traite des changements que subit l’économie face à la
mondialisation, examine les aspects touchant le commerce international et les flux
financiers.  L’accent est mis sur les points de vue, les tendances et les problèmes liés aux
dispositifs commerciaux régionaux et à l’investissement étranger direct, deux éléments
qui devraient jouer un rôle clé dans la stratégie d’intégration de l’Afrique dans l’économie
globale.  Le document tente d’expliquer la marginalisation de l’Afrique dans une économie
globale en voie de rapide intégration.  Il est démontré que, les pays industriels ayant été
plus largement ouverts aux exportations africaines qu’à celles d’autres régions du monde,
le problème est imputable aux politiques nationales restrictives et aux politiques
d’exportation et d’importation (ouverture) de l’Afrique.  Le document analyse les stratégies
à adopter pour insérer l’Afrique dans le monde en mutation de ce nouveau millénaire et
énumère les réformes à apporter aux économies africaines ainsi que les initiatives que
pourraient prendre les pays industrialisés et les institutions multilatérales, telles que l’OMC
et la Banque mondiale.*Background paper prepared for the African Development Report 2000 (African Development Bank). The author is an Associate
Professor at the Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan.




During the last decade of the 20th century, ‘Globalization’ has been the name of the game
throughout the world economy. Globalization, defined as the integration of production, distribution,
and use of goods and services among the economies of the world, has been manifested at a factor
level in the increasing flows of capital and labor, and at the product level in resounding growth in
world trade above and beyond the growth of world output. In the last decade, international trade
in goods and services has grown twice as fast as global output. In the same period, developing
countries as a whole have increasingly assumed a larger role in world trade with their share climbing
from 23 to almost 30 percent. Developing regions claimed 30 percent of global FDI stock in
1997.
The relocation and integration of production processes across national borders has been
reinforced by increasing flows of private capital, especially in the form of foreign direct investment
(FDI), which is often associated with global production strategies of multinational enterprises
(MNEs). Technological progress that reduces the cost of transportation, communications, and
financial transactions, coupled with declining trade barriers, has enlarged opportunities for anyone
searching for less costly production bases for exports and for spot production for local markets.
From the point of view of the recipients, capital inflows enlarge import capacity above and beyond
export earnings for a certain period. If inflows are used to increase domestic supply capacity and
augment international competitiveness, countries are rewarded with higher productivity growth
and export earnings, which preserves their import capacity in the longer run, thus creating a virtuous
cycle of high growth and trade integration.
One of the main features of the recent wave of globalization is a visible involvement of MNEs
in both trade and financial transactions. According to UN statistics, total sales of MNEs’ overseas
subsidiaries surpassed the value of world trade in goods and non-factor services by over 25
percent in 1993 (UN, 1996), and currently, more than two-thirds of world trade is carried out
between MNEs and their overseas subsidiaries. About half of these trade transactions are intra-
firm in nature.
Another key feature of the current globalization is a rapid expansion in service trade. Due to
the revolution in information technology (IT) and declining transportation costs, service-supplying
enterprises and service-demanding consumers engage more and more in cross-boarder transactions.6 Shigeru Otsubo
The successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round underpins the heightened prospects
for further integration by improving market access and securing a conducive environment. As a
World Bank report summarizes, the Uruguay Round achievements are: greater than one-third
average reduction of tariffs on manufactures; major scaling back of non-tariff barriers with the
abolition of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and voluntary export restraints; extension of multilateral
discipline to trade in agriculture and services; stronger and clearer rules, standards, and dispute
settlement procedures; and strengthening of the trading system through the creation of the World
Trade Organization (World Bank , 1996:2). The WTO Millennium Round will cover trade in
agricultural products and services among other things. These are the areas that could bring real
opportunities to developing countries, including those in Africa.
A visible resurgence in regional integration agreements in the 1990s should be carefully analyzed
given the failures of similar past initiatives. The WTO should also redefine its attitude and possibly
make new rules with respect to regional trading arrangements such as the free trade area that
GATT Article XXIV originally governed. For the countries in the South, it remains an open-ended
question whether the new regionalism, particularly the South-South arrangements widely seen in
the African and Latin American continents in the 1990s, can serve as an entry point toward global
integration.
As the crises of the 1990s such as the Mexican peso crisis and the Asian financial crisis
demonstrated, ‘Globalization’ brings, alongside new opportunities for increased trade and external
finances, new challenges of economic management in the face of discerning international investors.
Not only trade and financial regimes but also market institutions and political framework are often
questioned. When moving toward globalization, an abolishment of market distortions, particularly
bias against exports, is the imperative item on the government’s to-do list for integration.
Increasingly, mobile investment capital and the extension of global production networks at
the hands of MNEs have accentuated the economic effects of agglomeration. Given an establishment
of economies of scale in a certain industry in a certain country, latecomers to the game are placed
at great disadvantage. Status quo means a gradual loss of ground in the world economy under
globalization. In this context, the failure in African economies to create an environment conducive
to the private sector in general, and to the export sector and FDI capital in particular, throughout
the 1980s when other regions of the developing world were working to establish a virtuous cycle
of integration and growth, explains Africa’s current state of marginalization in the global economy.
This paper first reviews in Section 2, the changing economic environment under globalization.
Trends and issues in international trade and capital flows are reviewed. Particular attention is paid
to the trends, issues, and arguments about regional trade arrangements (RTAs) and foreign direct
investment (FDI) as these would be the key for Africa in its strategy to link itself to the global
economy. In Section 3, the paper introduces and analyzes the marginalization of Africa in the
rapidly integrating global economy. Possible explanations for this marginalization are introduced.
It is shown that industrial countries have been wide open to Africa’s exports relative to those from
other regions, and that the problem lies on the part of Africa in its restrictive domestic as well as
import (openness) and export policies. In Section 4, the paper considers strategies for linking
Africa to a changing world moving into the 21st century. Necessary reforms on the part of the
African economies, and initiatives that industrialized countries and multilateral institutions such as
the WTO and the World Bank can take are enumerated. Again, particular attention is paid to the
possibilities of cross-border initiatives (CBIs), and to the role of regional arrangements. Finally,
Section 5 summarizes the arguments and analyses presented in this paper.Linking Africa to a Changing World 7
Changing Economic Environment under Globalization
Globalization in a Historical Perspective
Looking back from the turn of the century, one can say that there was a marked acceleration
in world integration through trade in the mid-1980s, as is highly visible in Figure 1. As noted
earlier, international trade in goods and services has grown more than twice as fast as global
output on average since the mid-1980s. Similarly, we have observed a huge upsurge in cross-
border capital flows from the developed to the developing countries since around 1990 (Figure
2). By relieving import capacity constraint on the part of the developing economies, these resource
flows brought about an increased presence of the recipient economies, largely East Asian and
Latin American countries, in world trade.
History has observed multiple surges in the process of globalization through trade and financial
services. For instance, the Mediterranean trade propelled by Phoenician merchants during the
period of the 16th to the 13th centuries B.C., the East-West trade through the Silk Road developed
during the 11th century A.D., and the Age of Geographical Discovery during the 15th and the 16th
centuries propelled first by the desire of the western European economies to open the Commerce
of the Levant in order to circumvent the dominance of merchants from Venezia and Genova in the
Mediterranean Sea, and then by the rise in Mercantilism that became prevalent toward the end of
the 16th century and remained a dominant doctrine until the 18th century. In more recent history,
one can recall the process of global integration from the late 19th century up through WWI, often
associated with the second upsurge of colonialism in modern European history, characterized by
the colonization of Africa, Asia and the Pacific by the Great Powers.
Two World Bank reports summarize the developments during this period and compare those
with the recent wave of globalization (World Bank, 1996: Box 2-1 and World Bank, 1999: 69).
Export volumes rose by 4.3 percent per year in real terms during 1900-13 for thirty-two countries
representing some four-fifths of world output, population and exports (Maddison, 1989). Tariff
levels were low, with many countries engaging in virtually free trade. The stock of foreign capital
invested in developing countries (mostly in the form of FDI and public sector bonds) is estimated
to have risen by 3.7 percent per year in real terms. Further, international migration was scarcely
restricted and migration flows were substantial. However, unlike the present, most investment was
concentrated on infrastructure projects such as railroads and on the primary sector, not
manufacturing. In present-day trade integration, the shares of manufactures, intra-industry trade,
and service trade are higher. Also in contrast with the earlier situation, today capital flows, specifically
FDIs, are channeled through MNEs. In addition, cross-border migration is much more restricted
now.
Trends in International Trade Integration
A ratio of trade (exports plus imports of goods and services) to output (GDP) is one overall
ex-post facto measure of trade integration. Speed of integration, defined as the difference between
the growth rates of trade and of GDP, is the first order approximation of the rate of change in the
trade/output ratio, and is commonly used to measure the pace of trade integration. World aggregate
trade/output ratio more than doubled in the past 35 years, from 20 percent in 1960 to 45 percent
in 1996. During the same period, the ratio for developing countries increased from 31 percent in
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Figure 1:  Growth in World Trade and GDP, 1960-1997
(trade in goods and services)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999.
Figure 2:  Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries, 1970-1998
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years; there have been periods of rapid integration and stagnation (see Figure 3). Yet overall,
except for periods of macro instability, the world has kept a positive pace of integration since
1950; that is, international trade has grown faster than output. In this context, the recent wave of
globalization may be seen as a mere evolution in the process of economic integration. Actually, for
OECD economies, this recent upsurge in the speed of integration meant a revival in the trend of
trade integration, which had been slowed by the macroeconomic instabilities and heightened non-
tariff barriers in the 1970s and early 1980s. Figure 3 reveals that for developing countries, however,
the rising trend in trade integration that started in the mid-1980s was a rather new phenomenon. In
fact, more than three-quarters of the 20 percent rise in developing countries’ trade integration
ratio (trade/GDP) since 1960 was observed only after the mid-1980s. A series of reform and
liberalization efforts undertaken by developing countries in the past decade and a half represents
an effective shift in development strategy from an inward-oriented import-substituting framework
designed strategically to reduce dependence on the outer world, to an outward-oriented export-
promoting framework designed to create a virtuous cycle of higher integration and faster growth
with expanded opportunities. As far as developing countries are concerned, therefore, this upward
kink in the integration trend is a revolution that signifies a shift in development strategy.
Together with the rapid spread of international production networks established via FDIs
from MNEs (to be discussed in Section 2.3 and Section 2.5), a main feature of present-day trade
integration is a rapid expansion in service trade. Thanks to the innovation in information technology
(IT) and declining transportation costs, many professional services that were traditionally considered
non-tradables have become tradable and are actively traded both through traditional international
markets and through markets in cyberspace. Figure 4 illustrates the increasing shares of factor and
non-factor services in the global transactions of goods and services. The majority of factor receipts
are the returns on investment other than FDI (i.e. such as portfolio investment). In fact, in the latter
half of the 1990s, more than 80 percent of factor receipts were of this nature. Profits from FDI
tend to be reinvested locally. Table 1 shows that, during the period of 1985-95, the value of global
trade in non-factor services expanded at an annual compound rate of 11.8 percent, faster than the
rate of growth in goods trade (10.7 percent). During the same period, factor service exports
expanded at a rate of 10.8 percent per annum, reflecting a surge in capital flows including FDI and
their investment returns and dividends. By 1995, non-factor service already accounted for about
20 percent of global trade in goods and services. Among non-factor services, the value share of
transport services has been declining, reflecting reduction in unit transportation costs. Value shares
of ‘insurance and financial services’, and ‘communications, computer, information, and other
services’ are rising (Figure 5). The latter category covers international telecommunications and
postal and courier services; computer data; news-related service transactions between residents
and nonresidents; construction services; royalties and license fees; miscellaneous business,
professional, and technical services; personal, cultural, and recreational services.
Figure 6 shows an index of computing costs for the period of 1975-1994. The period starts
with an IBM mainframe; after which subsequent developments including the advent of the IBM
personal computer in 1981, and of Sun Microsystems 2 in 1984 contribute to cutting the cost of
computation to one-hundredth of the original cost. In the following decade up through 1994 when
Pentium chips were introduced, computing costs had again fallen to one-hundredth of the 1984
level. Showing similar drops in cost, Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of the cost of a 3-minute
phone call between New York and London. It was about US$245 in 1930, but by 1994, the same
3-minute call cost only 3 dollars and 30 cents. This is indicative of declining cost barriers in the






















































Figure 3:  Trade Integration































































Note: * Based on national income accounts. Trade in goods and services.
Source: DEC Analytical Database, World Bank
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999.Linking Africa to a Changing World 11
Figure 4:  World Trade Composition
































































Figure 5:  Components of Non-Factor Service Trade















































Goods exports 12 Shigeru Otsubo
the world in 1994. In Zurich and Tokyo, hiring one credit clerk costs 78,100 and 63,400 dollars
respectively, whereas it costs only 3,900 dollars in Jakarta, 1,900 in Bombay, and 1,600 in Nairobi.
There seems to be a huge potential for the industrial countries to outsource back-office functions
to low-wage developing countries with the use of a computer network. Unlike manufacturing
trade, service trade requires a smaller amount of initial fixed investment on the part of the
entrepreneurs once the information infrastructure is provided by the public sector or by a public-
private initiative. The same is true of other financial transactions, computer programming, accounting,
designing and so on. With proper training and investment in infrastructure, this opens the door for
new opportunities in many developing countries.
GATT Uruguay Round and WTO
The successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round in 1994 was a big push for the
process of trade integration. Reflecting the shift from the import-substituting to export-promoting
strategies among many developing countries, a large number of developing countries participated
and played an important role during this round for the first time in the history of GATT negotiations.
A World Bank report summarizes the achievement and assesses the impacts of the GATT Uruguay
Round (World Bank, 1996: Ch.2).
• Trade in manufactures will benefit from the substantial tariff reductions under the Uruguay
Round…..and from the abolition of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and voluntary export
restraints (VERs). In industrial countries average tariffs will be reduced by 40 percent,
and the coverage of non-tariff barriers against developing-country exports will decline
from 18 percent to about 5 percent.  In developing countries the agreed maximum tariffs
will fall by 28 percent.
Table 1: Service Trade
(US$ billion)              Annual growth rate
1975 1985 1995 1975-85 1985-95
(% share) (% share) (% share) (%) (%)
Goods exports 841 1,836 5,066 8.1 10.7
(74%) (69%) (68%)
Non-factor service exports 178 410 1,245 8.7 11.8
(16%) (16%) (18%)
Transport services 57 114 301 7.1 10.2
(32%) (28%) (24%)
Travel services 46 122 404 10.6 12.8
(25%) (30%) (32%)
Professional services 76 177 547 8.7 12.0
(43%) (43%) (44%)
Factor service exports 114 400 1,114 13.4 10.8
(10%) (15%) (15%)
Exports of goods, services 1,136 2,647 7,425
and income (100%) (100%) (100%)
Note: Numbers may not add up to the total due to rounding. Growth rates are compound rates.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999.Linking Africa to a Changing World 13
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Source: World Bank, database for Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 1995.
Figure 6:
Figure 7:
Source: World Bank, database for Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 1995.14 Shigeru Otsubo
Table 2. Gross Income of Bank Credit Clerks*, 1994








Rio de Janeiro   7,600
Jakarta   3,900
Bombay   1,900
Nairobi   1,600
Note: * With completed banking training, 10 years of experience, around 35 years of age,
and married with two children.
Source: World Bank, database for Global Economic Prospects and the Developing
Countries, 1995.
• Bringing agricultural trade under multilateral discipline and converting non-tariff barriers
to tariffs are important accomplishments of the Round, but the actual liberalization achieved
is limited and substantially less than earlier expectations.
• Gains from improved market access will be widespread but unevenly distributed across
regions and countries. Countries’ overall gains from liberalization will depend more on
their own trade policy actions than on those of others.
• Gains from improved security of market access-increased coverage of bindings,
strengthened dispute settlement procedures under the new World Trade Organization
(WTO), clearer rules and standards-are an important benefit of the Round.
• Two areas of major concern to least-developed countries during the negotiations-
preference erosion and higher food import costs-are unlikely to cause significant
adjustment strains. (I will reexamine this issue in the African context in Section 3 of this
paper.)
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the tariff reductions achieved in the Uruguay Round negotiations. In
industrial countries the trade-weighted average tariff rate was lowered by 40 percent, from 6.2 to
3.7 percent (Figure 8). Average tariffs that developing countries levy on imported manufactures
have also declined visibly except in Africa.
The WTO, established in 1995 as a successor for the GATT, should deal in its Millennium
Round with new issues of relevance as well as the issues inherited from the Uruguay Round.
Liberalization of agricultural trade that was brought up in the previous round and negotiations on
service trade are the so-called built-in agenda for the Millennium Round. Other candidates for the
new round can be categorized into two groups. One group relates to an enlargement of areas
where WTO’s basic principles can be applied, such as trade barrier reductions on some mining
and manufacturing products (in particular, textiles and clothing), and rule making for trade facilitation,
electric commerce (E-commerce), and for international investment. The other group of issues
























Figure 8:  Average MFN Tariffs in Industrial Countries
(On imports of manufactures from various regions)





















Figure 9:  Average Tariffs in Developing Countries
(On imports of manufactures from various regions)
Source: World Bank, database for Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries,
1995.16 Shigeru Otsubo
practices permitted in GATT/WTO regimes, and a rise in new regionalism and the increasing
numbers of regional integration arrangements that are again permitted under the auspices of the
GATT Article XXIV. Apart from these issues that are naturally under the jurisdiction within the
realm of the WTO, there are new challenges in the areas of trade and environment, and trade and
labor standards that presumably have to be dealt with in coordination with other international
organizations such as the ILO, the World Bank, and other U.N. organizations.
Table 3 shows the number of MNEs and their affiliates in major countries. As noted before,
two-thirds of world trade is now carried out though the global network of MNEs and their affiliates.
The majority of FDIs are undertaken in conjunction with this extension of the MNEs’ global
network. Rule making for and facilitation of these cross-border investment activities that benefit
both FDI suppliers and recipients (including many developing country members) should be high
on the WTO agenda. Although the recent Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) hosted by
the OECD has collapsed in its making, securing the MFN principle and non-discrimination in host
markets for international investment including FDI would greatly enhance the prospects of further
financial integration.
Table 3.  Number of MNEs and Their Affiliates in Major Countries
Number of Number of (B)/(A) Data year
MNEs (A) Affiliates (B)
U.S.A. 3,470 18,608 5.36 1994
Japan 3,967 3,405 0.86 1995
Germany 7,292 11,581 1.59 1994
France 2,126 8,682 4.08 1995
U.K. 1,467 3,894 2.65 1992
Canada 1,691 4,583 2.71 1995
China 379 45,000 118.73 1993
Korea 4,806 3,878 0.81 1996
Singapore n.a. 19,160 n.a. 1994
Total
Developed
Countries 36,380 93,628 2.57
Note:
1. MNEs are defined as enterprises which run their business in more than two countries.
2. (A) is the number of MNEs originating from the corresponding country, and (B) is the number of foreign
affiliates in said country.
Source: United Nations, World Investment Report, 1997; Kaigai Jigyou Katsudou Chousa, 1995.
Table 4 replicates the increased incidence of antidumping measures reported in a recent
World Bank report (World Bank, 1999: 60). Whereas the number of antidumping measures applied
by traditional users declined toward the completion of the Uruguay Round, those applied by new,
developing country members skyrocketed in the 1990s. The abusive use of antidumping measures
is clearly against the GATT/WTO principles and has to be curtailed and monitored. This probably
requires adjustments on the part of the WTO.Linking Africa to a Changing World 17
Table 4:  Reported Antidumping Actions by Members of the GATT/WTO
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
New users 24 17 19 20 48 70 162 114 83 148 115
Traditional 96 107 77 145 180 256 137 114 73 73 118
users
Note: Traditional users of antidumping laws are Australia, Canada, the European Community (and its successor,
the European Union), New Zealand, and the United States.  New users are Argentina, Brazil, India, the
Republic of Korea, Mexico, and South Aftica.
Source: Adopted from World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000, Table 2.1.
Original source: Miranda, Torres, and Ruiz (1998).
Table 5:  Number of Existing Regional Integration Schemes
( by their establishment year)
Regions Prior to 1969 1970-79 1980-89 1990- Total
Europe 1 2 0 36 39
Americas 2 1 15 22 40
Asia and Oceania 0 0 1 2 3
Middle East 0 0 3 1 4
Africa 2 2 0 4 8
Other
(across multiple regions) 1 1 1 4 7
Total 6 6 20 69 101
Source:  JETRO, White Paper on International Trade, 1996.
Table 5 shows the number of existing regional integration schemes by year of establishment.
Of the 101 existing regional integration schemes counted, 69 were established in the 1990s. Motives
for this recent upsurge should be carefully analyzed and the rules should be adjusted or re-established.
The 1996 declaration from a WTO ministerial meeting held in Singapore indicated the generally
positive attitude of the WTO regarding the new wave of regional trade arrangements (RTAs). The
WTO should work to ensure that RTAs are complementary to the WTO’s goal of global free
trade. However, given the concurrent and heightened interest in the WTO process by developing
countries manifested in the increasing number of memberships (Table 6), many developing countries
may regard regional integration schemes as a key to the global economy and to the negotiations at
the global, multilateral level. If so, a careful, time-framed preferential treatment for the developing
countries might be necessary for WTO-friendly regional integration initiatives. The paper comes
back to this issue in Section 4 (Linking Africa to a Changing World) after carefully reviewing the
underpinnings of the recent upsurge in regionalism under globalization.18 Shigeru Otsubo
Regionalization under Globalization
One of the commonly supported hypotheses about world trade, often given without statistical
validation, is that intra-regional trade has been growing faster than global trade. Some economists
even express concern that the world will be trisected into three economic and trade zones: Europe,
the Americas, and Asia. The former hypothesis has to be verified in light of available direction-of-
trade statistics (Anderson and Norheim, 1993: 91-109; Norheim, Finger, and Anderson, 1993;
and Braga, 1994). The latter hypothesis of a trisected world has been a controversial issue among
world trade analysts and has been examined both qualitatively and quantitatively using theory-
based computable models (Bhagwati, 1992; Krugman, 1992; and Frankel, Stein, and Wei, 1993).
In this subsection, the paper examines the trends in trade regionalization and reviews cases of
market-driven, geography-oriented integration versus policy-driven integration, often enacted within
frameworks of regional trading arrangements (RTAs). It also recognizes the failures of past inward-
looking RTAs that were often formed without economic gravity, and discusses motives for new
outward-oriented RTAs.
Trends in Market-Driven versus Policy-Driven Regionalization
There are two ways to define trading regions. One method defines regions as natural
geographical areas such as Asia and Latin America, and the other defines regions as countries and
economies grouped through RTAs, which themselves range from loose cooperative bodies such
as ASEAN before the enactment of the AFTA agreement, to freer trade and investment
arrangements such as NAFTA, to common markets such as the EU. The two types of regions,
geographical areas and RTAs, are highly correlated but not identical. Economic regionalism can
be either market-driven or policy-driven (Hallett and Braga, 1993: 3). Market-driven regionalism
is the product of natural locational phenomena that promote stronger economic ties within a
geographic area. This is regionalization formed around natural economic gravities such as market
size (GDP and population), income levels (representing production and expenditure patterns),
and distance (representing transportation costs). Whereas market-driven regionalism is a natural,
un-legislated phenomenon, policy-driven regionalism often results in RTAs.
Table 7 presents the recent history (from 1970 on) of inter- and intra-regional trade segments.
The only visible increase in intra-regional trade is that of Asia (specifically, East Asia). However,
this is not due to policy-driven integration, but rather to gravity-oriented market-driven integration.
Asia’s increasing economic gravity is proved by the increasing share of Industrial Countries-to-
Asia trade flow. The table shows stagnant intra-Africa and intra-Middle East trade. Intra-Europe
trade collapsed with the break-up of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Long-stagnant intra-Latin
Table 6: Number of GATT/WTO Member Countries
1980 1987 1990 1999
Non-OECD members 61 65 76 110
OECD members 24 24 24 24
Source:  Adopted from World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000, Table 2.1.
Original source:  WTO, Annual Report, various years.Linking Africa to a Changing World 19
American and Caribbean trade has started to show signs of resurgence only recently. The South-
South share in world trade increased from 5 percent in 1970 to 13.3 percent in 1994. Asia has
been a driving force in this increased South-South trade, with its share of intra-regional trade
increasing from only 1.1 percent in 1970 to 7.1 percent in 1994.
Share in World Trade (% of world total) Growth of Trade Segments (%)
Export of To 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1994 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-94
WORLD WORLD 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 23.3 19.0 0.3 12.8 5.6
OECD OECD 58.1 49.5 46.8 49.7 55.2 48.7 47.9 19.1 17.7 1.6 15.3 2.1
EU EU 27.1 25.5 25.0 22.7 29.1 24.0 23.6 21.3 18.7 -1.5 18.8 0.6
OECD LDC 19.3 23.1 20.2 17.8 16.6 19.6 19.3 27.7 15.9 -2.1 11.3 9.5
OECD AFRICA 3.6 3.8 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.3 24.6 15.3 -7.3 7.4 -0.3
OECD ASIA 5.3 5.2 5.4 6.3 7.2 9.2 9.4 23.0 20.1 3.6 15.8 13.0
OECD MIDDLE EAST 2.2 5.0 4.6 3.7 2.3 2.5 2.1 45.3 16.9 -3.1 2.2 4.4
OECD EUROPE 3.3 4.4 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 30.7 10.0 -2.6 14.2 5.2
OECD WESTERN HEMISP 4.8 4.6 4.1 3.1 2.8 3.7 3.8 22.7 16.3 -4.2 10.9 13.7
LDC OECD 14.1 16.3 20.2 19.0 16.9 17.8 18.1 30.3 24.6 -0.6 10.5 7.5
AFRICA OECD 3.1 3.1 2.3 2.5 1.7 1.4 1.3 26.4 14.1 2.2 5.1 -0.4
ASIA OECD 3.3 3.9 5.3 6.7 7.6 9.3 9.5 28.2 26.9 5.2 16.1 11.5
MIDDLE EAST OECD 2.1 4.6 7.6 3.6 2.7 2.1 1.9 59.5 34.0 -13.0 9.2 -3.6
EUROPE OECD 1.2 1.1 1.2 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3 21.1 20.7 20.1 10.4 8.4
WESTERN HEMISP OECD 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.9 2.7 2.9 3.1 22.5 19.7 1.2 5.8 9.5
LDC LDC 5.0 6.8 8.9 10.3 9.9 12.4 13.3 33.4 26.3 4.4 12.5 13.8
AFRICA AFRICA 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 15.0 12.6 -0.1 13.9 8.6
ASIA ASIA 1.1 1.2 2.2 3.1 4.5 6.4 7.1 25.4 34.6 7.6 22.0 18.7
MIDDLE EAST MIDDLE EAST 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 42.2 35.5 -2.9 12.2 -6.2
EUROPE EUROPE 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.2 1.0 0.9 1.4 22.2 21.7 8.4 -4.0 20.1
WESTERN HEMISP WESTERN HEMISP 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 33.8 22.3 -10.4 14.2 12.5
Asia's South-South Trade Share in World Trade (% of world total) Growth of Trade Segments (%)
Export of To 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1994 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-94
Asia LDC 1.61 1.92 3.25 4.33 5.55 7.91 8.49 28.2 32.4 6.4 19.0 17.5
Asia AFRICA 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.23 28.0 28.7 -4.9 15.8 11.6
Asia ASIA 1.12 1.19 2.17 3.08 4.45 6.45 7.09 25.4 34.6 7.6 22.0 18.7
Asia MIDDLE EAST 0.16 0.32 0.50 0.53 0.36 0.53 0.48 48.1 30.0 2.7 4.9 13.7
Asia EUROPE 0.30 0.21 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.27 14.8 27.6 4.6 13.4 1.9
Asia WESTERN HEMISP 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.39 0.43 50.4 30.8 1.0 16.0 26.8
LDC ASIA 1.74 1.92 2.59 3.65 5.03 7.58 7.75 26.0 25.8 8.1 20.1 17.5
AFRICA ASIA 0.25 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.26 0.24 16.7 11.2 9.0 16.8 17.6
ASIA ASIA 1.15 1.21 1.81 2.67 4.11 6.28 6.53 25.4 28.4 8.7 22.9 18.4
MIDDLE EAST ASIA 0.16 0.31 0.41 0.41 0.33 0.47 0.46 42.6 26.0 1.4 7.6 14.9
EUROPE ASIA 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.21 23.7 24.1 30.8 12.5 -5.8
WESTERN HEMISP ASIA 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.28 0.31 38.8 21.4 4.3 14.1 40.5
Note : Period average growth rates are computed as simple arithmetic averages.
Source : Author's own computation using data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
Table 7:  Growth in Trade Segments  (current dollar direction-of-trade statistics)20 Shigeru Otsubo
What about the growth of policy-driven intra-RTAs trade? Is its share of intra-RTA trade
growing? Yeats, using UNCTAD’s data and UN/COMTRADE, computed the share of world
trade undertaken by existing ‘minilateral’ preferential arrangements (Yeats, 1995: Table 1). In the
early 1990s, about 43 percent of world trade in all merchandise and 47 percent of trade in
manufactures was undertaken by various RTAs. OECD-related arrangements claimed, respectively,
40 percent and 44 percent of world trade in total merchandise and in manufactures trade, with
only 3 percent accruing to RTAs within developing regions. Within OECD-related RTAs, intra-
trade in developed Europe claimed 31 percent of all merchandise and 34 percent of manufactures.
By measuring the changing share of groups’ exports destined to intra-group countries up to 1991,
from 1970 on for RTAs in OECD and from 1960 on for RTAs in developing regions, Yeats
concluded that “with the exception of the European Community there is no clear evidence of the
growing importance of intra-regional trade relative to what occurred in the past.”(Yeats, 1995:
11)  Using IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, de Melo and Panagariya found similar results
(De Melo and Panagariya,1992: Table 1).
Table 8 shows a degree of trade regionalization (intra-regional trade as percentage of the
region’s total trade), with other indicators such as average trade integration ratio (trade/output
ratio) of comprising members and shares (in world trade) of major RTAs. As previous studies
found, trade regionalization proceeded in EU12 with the share of intra-regional trade growing
from 40 percent in 1960 to 60.2 percent in 1992.1  Trade integration more than doubled in the EU
during this period. For the other RTAs, except for the policy-driven initial rise in the share of intra-
regional trade, the developments in trade regionalization ranged from insignificantly positive, to
stagnant, to collapsing. Statistics show that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area (1989) did not
result in a narrow trade regionalization, as once feared, while it accelerated trade integration in
both participating countries. Although a pre-NAFTA boost in trade regionalization was visible in
the early 1990s, evidence is still too scarce to judge whether either NAFTA or an expanded
NAFTA could lead to RTA-based trade regionalization.
In sum, East Asia so far has been the only clear case of market-driven trade regionalization,
whereas the European Union has been the only case of policy-driven trade regionalization. The
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area should be seen as more of a market-driven integration. One should
also note that, even in the case of the European Union, economic gravity between the member
countries played an indisputable role in the success of this policy-driven integration. Conclusive
evidence has not been observed yet for the cases of North-South RTAs such as NAFTA (and
expanded NAFTA), APEC, and a possible expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe.
GATT/ WTO and Regional Trading Arrangements
Given the successful completion of the Uruguay Round and the rather dismal performance of
past RTAs, what can we say about the prospects for new RTAs? Acknowledging that MFN-
based (that is, GATT/WTO-based) trade should be the first best, advantages derived from the
existence and expansion of current RTAs and future offspring must be determined by whether or
not they produce more net trade over and above the level possible under GATT/WTO-based
MFN trade liberalization. If their relative net effects on trade are negative, the arrangement should
be labeled ‘not beneficial’ to the fostering of world trade.
In the past, RTAs were allowed under the GATT framework, despite the fact that these
arrangements in practice meant a departure from the MFN principle (Bhagwati, 1991: 69). Article
XXIV of GATT accommodates RTAs by establishing the conditions for the existence of customsLinking Africa to a Changing World 21
Table 8:  Trade Integration, Regionalization, and Share of Regional Trading Arrangements
(1960-1994)
Source: The World Bank, DEC Analytical Database; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington, D.C.)
1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 European Community (EC, 1957)
Trade Integration Ratio  a 26.1 36.5 40.2 45.0 48.4 55.6 57.3 58.9 58.6 60.7
Share in Intra-Regional Trade b 40.0 51.7 51.2 52.4 53.5 59.2 59.6 60.2 55.5 55.4
Share in Total World Exports c 40.7 41.3 40.2 37.7 35.0 40.4 39.3 38.9 35.8 35.0
Share in Total World Imports d 40.7 41.8 39.7 40.4 34.1 40.4 40.5 39.4 34.3 33.7
2 European Free Trade Area (EFTA, 1960)
Trade Integration Ratio 35.8 44.9 47.8 53.8 57.9 63.9 64.0 66.3 66.9 69.5
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 20.0 26.5 25.2 22.6 22.2 20.5 19.8 19.4 19.0 18.9
Share in Total World Exports 18.5 15.3 13.7 13.3 12.6 13.6 13.0 12.7 11.8 12.0
Share in Total World Imports 21.1 17.2 15.4 14.2 12.5 14.5 13.4 13.1 12.0 11.9
3 Central American Common Market(CACM, 1961)
Trade Integration Ratio 42.9 49.1 49.2 53.8 42.8 49.2 48.7 54.2 56.3 57.4
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 6.7 25.1 20.2 21.7 12.5 11.9 13.8 15.5 13.5 12.7
Share in Total World Exports 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Share in Total World Imports 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
4 Latin American Free Trade Area/Latin American Integration Association (LAFTA, 1960, 1980)
Trade Integration Ratio 27.6 25.7 23.9 26.6 24.0 30.1 32.2 35.5 36.7 38.4
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 8.7 10.6 12.0 12.7 10.6 12.1 13.9 15.9 15.6 15.4
Share in Total World Exports 6.9 4.5 3.9 4.4 4.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.8 4.0
Share in Total World Imports 6.0 4.0 4.6 4.5 2.8 2.5 3.0 3.4 4.2 4.4
5 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement(ANZCERTA, 1983)
Trade Integration Ratio 28.6 31.1 30.8 33.1 36.3 42.4 44.7 45.9 47.5 50.7
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 5.1 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.4 7.4 7.5 8.1 8.7
Share in Total World Exports 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
Share in Total World Imports 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6
6 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1967)
Trade Integration Ratio 48.9 58.3 67.4 83.9 78.9 106.9 112.6 112.6 119.7 131.0
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 7.5 17.3 13.2 15.6 17.9 16.6 17.5 17.6 18.4 19.1
Share in Total World Exports 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.9 3.9 4.2 4.7 4.9 5.6 6.0
Share in Total World Imports 1.9 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.3 4.6 5.0 5.1 6.0 6.3
7 Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (ANDEAN PACT, 1969)
Trade Integration Ratio 54.3 51.5 42.9 43.4 38.5 43.1 45.7 49.8 51.6 51.5
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 1.8 2.9 6.0 6.0 5.7 6.0 7.3 8.1 9.2 10.0
Share in Total World Exports 3.8 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
Share in Total World Imports 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0
8 Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS, 1975)
Trade Integration Ratio 51.4 61.9 71.2 91.7 69.3 54.9 54.9 55.4 54.8 50.7
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 2.3 2.8 4.1 4.4 6.0 9.0 8.1 7.8 9.6 10.8
Share in Total World Exports 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5
Share in Total World Imports 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5
9 Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA, 1987)
Trade Integration Ratio N.A. 46.3 53.0 47.0 40.0 41.4 42.1 41.6 41.4 41.7
Share in Intra-Regional Trade N.A. 8.6 7.1 8.1 4.6 6.2 4.8 5.0 6.7 7.0
Share in Total World Exports N.A. 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Share in Total World Imports N.A. 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
10 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area/North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1989, 1994)
Trade Integration Ratio 10.7 14.2 16.1 18.5 20.0 25.0 25.8 27.2 28.5 30.4
Share in Intra-Regional Trade 32.3 36.6 32.8 27.8 33.8 31.3 30.9 30.9 32.1 32.7
Share in Total World Exports 26.0 22.2 19.5 16.8 17.8 16.3 16.6 16.6 17.4 17.1
Share in Total World Imports 21.2 20.4 19.1 18.3 23.7 19.2 18.5 18.5 20.6 20.7
a. Export plus import volumes of merchandise and services, ratio to GDP.
b. Intraregional trade as percentage of the region's total trade (merchandise only).
c. Regional exports as percentage of total world exports (merchandise only).
d. Regional imports as percentage of total world imports (merchandise only).22 Shigeru Otsubo
unions and free trade areas (FTAs). Even though the provisions of Article XXIV were devised to
minimize departures from the MFN principle by requiring RTAs to be based on an across-the-
board reduction of protection, this requirement was thereafter ignored without any formal sanctions.
Furthermore, the ‘Enabling Clause’ of 1979 allowed developing counties to establish regional and
global preferential arrangements that did not conform to Article XXIV.
Whether or not RTAs produce GATT/WTO-plus net trade gains depends largely on the
relative size of trade creation (positive effects) and trade diversion (negative effects) under the
postulated arrangements (Viner, 1950). As discussed above, although there were different
developments in manufactures trade and agricultural trade, the EU’s success in fostering intra-
regional trade while adding net world trade was accomplished by increasing trade within the EU
while also increasing extra-regional trade, surpassing smaller trade diversion effects observed
particularly in agricultural trade (Pohl and Sorsa, 1992; and Sapir, 1989). This is shown in Table
8 by the EU’s increasing intra-regional trade share with nondeclining share in total world imports.2
On the contrary, past Latin American trade arrangements led to very limited trade expansion
among regional groups, given that the treaties incorporated a protectionist approach and involved
strong discriminatory practices and complex regulations.  Under these circumstances, the expansion
of trade would not have been net trade creating for the member countries (Rajapatirana, 1994: 6).
The failure of the Latin American RTAs of the 1960s that followed an inward-oriented trade
strategy, such as the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and Andean Pact, was
confirmed by the stagnant and even collapsing intra-regional trade shares after policy-forced
increases in the early years of enactment. In the Andean Pact, as shown in Table 8, inefficient
trade redirection resulted in a reduction in competitiveness and decline in trade itself, manifested
in a rapidly declining trade integration ratio (trade/output ratio) and in decreased shares in world
exports and imports. It was a case of negative trade creation with a substantial level of trade
diversion.
LAFTA, too, showed a substantial level of trade diversion and very little trade creation. The
Central American Common Market (CACM) was successful in terms of expanding intra-regional
trade due largely to an across-the-board liberalization compatible with the MFN principle within
the group as manifested in the sustained high trade regionalization ratio and rather stable shares in
world trade shown in Table 8 (up to 1980).  However, CACM too failed to add to world trade
due to trade diversion caused by inward-oriented trade strategies similar to those of the other
early Latin American RTAs. Trade regionalization, created by overriding economic efficiencies,
also collapsed in later years. In reality, as the numbers suggest, “most preferential trading blocs
accomplished little, neither creating nor diverting much trade.”(World Bank, 1994a: 65) The
numbers are even more convincing if compared with a gravity-driven trade dynamism in ASEAN
countries.
Following a period of structural reform and trade liberalization in the 1980s, Latin America
now sees the new wave of RTAs coming about both by the restructuring of existing arrangements
such as the Andean Pact and the CACM, and by the creation of new arrangements such as
Mercosur and the Group of Three. Having learned from the failures of past arrangements
characterized by inward-looking strategies that brought an inefficient shift of productive resources,
losses in welfare, and trade diversions, “this is a second regionalization based on open trade
compared to the first regionalization based on protection”(Bhagwati, 1992: 542). Outward-oriented
strategies that promote export promotion in a more open trading environment should be conducive
to the growth of international trade. Signs of success have already been observed, and they are
visible in the Latin American sections of Table 8. Table 8 (rows for CACM, LAFTA, and theLinking Africa to a Changing World 23
Andean Pact) also reveals early signs of success in the increasing trade integration ratios, shares in
intra-regional trade, total world exports, and imports after 1990.3
The record for NAFTA, although short, is also promising.  The principles of the Canada-
U.S. FTA seem to have been preserved. That is, NAFTA results in a higher average trade integration
ratio among participating members, while experiencing a rather stable ratio of intra-regional trade
and preserving its share in the world import market. NAFTA, so far, seems to have been creating
deeper trade integration with a minimal amount of trade diversion.
Displacement by or new proliferation of outward-oriented RTAs among the developing
regions, in addition to the more open North-South cooperation, improves prospects for world
trade as long as these RTAs are GATT/WTO-plus.
New Motives for Regional Trading Arrangements4
Since the successful completion of the Uruguay Round significantly reduces the margins for
preferential treatment under RTAs, it is worthwhile to examine whether or not the new rationales
for RTAs are more conducive to net creation of trade at the world level than the old. Observing a
surge in the number of new RTAs in the early 1990s, Braga asserts that the new regional integration
arrangements are perceived as a way to advance economic integration beyond conventional trade
liberalization (Braga, 1994: 7). RTAs tend to focus not only on trade liberalization in goods but
also on the liberalization of trade in services, movements of factors of production, the harmonization
of regulatory regimes, and the coordination of domestic policies that influence international
competitiveness. As such, they have become experiments in ‘deep integration’ rather than simple
trade agreements.
Braga also notes that the new regionalism contains an important defensive component.
Countries have been pursuing RTAs with major trading partners either because they fear a future
surge in protectionist practices or because they are looking for respite (through preferential
treatment) from trade instruments that are perceived to be protectionist (such as antidumping
actions). The ‘safe haven’ rationale gained additional force because of the perception that the
world economy may be breaking down into three large trading areas centered around Europe,
North America, and East Asia. Accordingly, worries about being left out have enhanced the interest
of developing countries in North-South RTAs. This has certainly influenced the view of some
Western Hemisphere developing countries concerning NAFTA, as well as ACP states (under the
Lomé Convention) with close economic ties to the European Community (Yeats, 1995: 7).
Yeats cites the ‘insurance’ rationale as the third important motive in the formation of the new
wave of RTAs (Yeats, 1995: 7). In some cases, countries may feel they are able to ensure that no
reversal will occur in their own trade reforms by participating in an RTA. This is important for
those countries, such as Mexico, committed to a liberalization process. In these cases it could be
argued that the agreement prevents any increase in trade barriers. This could be especially important
for developing countries that are not GATT members, or in sectors where tariffs have not been
legally bound under GATT provisions.
Closely related to this third motive, Rajapatirana refers to the ‘buy out’ rationale (Rajapatirana,
1994: 24). An RTA that commits member countries to binding the tariff pattern could be used to
achieve GATT-plus trade creation. This would be the case if a country does its best to liberalize its
trade regime under MFN, but finds a limit to its ability to reduce protection beyond a certain level.
An RTA could then be used to buy out domestic interests that oppose further liberalization.24 Shigeru Otsubo
In a nutshell, the new generation of outward-oriented RTAs, created or revised in response
to the past failures of inward-oriented trading arrangements, and prompted by the new ‘deep
integration,’ ‘safe haven,’ ‘insurance,’ and ‘buy out’ motives, have the potential to be GATT-plus,
producing higher net world trade growth and deeper world trade integration.
Classification on Regional Economic Integration
In search of scale economies and scope economies with deeper integration, a regional
integration arrangement can evolve further from an establishment of a preferential tariff agreement
(PTA) to a free trade area (FTA), to a customs union, common market, economic union, and
finally to a political union as described in Table 9. In a Free Trade Area (FTA), tariffs and other
trade barriers are abolished among member countries, but they retain the right to set their own
national tariffs and barriers to non-members. However, individual tariff rates may not be effective
as there is a potential problem where commodities from non-member countries could be imported
to the area through the lowest-tariff country. Restrictions on product origin are often utilized to
cope with this problem. In a Customs Union (CU), tariffs and barriers among members are abolished
and a common tariff is set on imports from non-member countries. In a Common Market, in
addition to the abolishment of trade barriers among members, movements of factors such as capital
and labor are liberalized. Standards and certifications are harmonized. Beyond conditions of the
Common Market, an Economic Union also includes harmonization of economic and social policies,
and legal systems. Finally in a Political Union, fiscal and monetary policies are unified and sovereignty
of each country is transferred to a supra-national common body.
Table 9:  Classification on Regional Economic Integration
Free Trade Customs Common Economic Political
Area  Union Market  Union Union
Abolishment of tariffs and b bbbb
quantitative restrictions on
trade among members
Common tariff on imports X bbbb
from non-members
Free factor movements X X bbb
among members
Harmonization of
economic policies X X X bb
Unification of policies by a X X X X b
supranational organization
Source:  Compiled according to Balassa, Bella (1973) The Theory of Economic Integration.
Table 10 classifies the world’s main regional integration schemes and Africa’s regional
integration initiatives. The evolution of regional integration is most advanced in Europe. The EU is
now in the process of transition from a common market to an economic union with the advent of
the European Central Bank. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), too, has a long history
of evolution. A loose form of regional cooperation, such as the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), hasLinking Africa to a Changing World 25
Table 10: Classification of Main Regional Integration (excl. bilateral agreements)



















1. African RIs in parentheses indicate their objectives.
2. SADC is a cross-border initiative (CBI) aiming at sectoral coordination and transport links.
3. PTA also aims at establishing a regional development bank on top of a multilateral clearing house.
EU: European Union
EFTA: European Free Trade Association
CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Agreement
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
LAFTA: Latin American Free Trade Association
MERCOSUR: Mercado Comun del Sur
ANCOM: Andean Common Market
CACM: Central American Common Market
CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market
APEC: Forum for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations
AFTA: ASEAN Free Trade Area
SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
CEAO: West African Economic Community
MRU: Mano River Union
CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
UDEAC: Central African Customs and Economic Union
PTA: Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area
SADC: Southern African Development Community (formerly SADCC: Southern African Development
             Coordination Conference)
SACU: Southern African Customs Union26 Shigeru Otsubo
been characteristic in Asia, as this region’s integration has been led by the forces of economic
gravity. Pushed by the formation of NAFTA and an expansion in the EU, however, ASEAN
economies recently formed the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In the Americas, most of the
regional initiatives aim to form a customs union in the Western Hemisphere. Although regional
integration schemes of the 1960s and 1970s failed due to the reasons explained earlier, the North-
South integration of NAFTA possesses high prospects for success and expansion. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the United States was a hegemon and a staunch supporter of multilateralism. This time
around, however, the United States is a major player in regional trading arrangements (De Melo
and Panagariya, 1993: 3). In Africa, the majority of regional integration initiatives, often with
overlapping memberships, aimed to form a common market but fell well short of even forming a
free trade area due to the slow process of trade liberalization (Lyakurwa, McKay, Ng’eco and
Kennes, 1997). In Section 4, the paper revisits the issue of regional integration in linking Africa to
the global economy.
Trends in International Financial Integration
In the early 1990s, there was a surge of private capital flows to developing countries,
motivated in part by successful policy reforms and export success (Figures 2 and 10). Flows
totaled over $1.5 trillion during 1990-98. The amount continued to grow even after the Mexican
peso crisis in 1994. Although the inflows slowed from $299 billion in 1997 to $227 billion in 1998
due to the Asian financial crisis, a recovery in capital flows to developing countries is expected as
more and more mutual and pension funds in the industrial countries look for investment opportunities
in the South, and as MNEs continue to extend their global production and service networks.
Annual FDI net inflows to developing countries increased from $24.5 billion in 1990 to $163
billion in 1997. For the recipient countries, this meant much more financing for imports than they
had access to previously. During the oil price hikes of 1973-74 and 1979-80, purchasing power
was transferred to oil-exporting countries through changes in terms of trade, and eventually reached
other developing regions, notably Latin America, in the form of private capital flows. These transfers
were translated into higher import demand by direct and indirect recipient regions. A surge in
capital flows targeted to highly absorbent regions such as East Asia and Latin America created
heightened import demand among recipients in a more direct manner, supporting the growth of
world trade.
Portfolio equity flows rapidly expanded from $3.7 billion in 1990 to $49 billion in 1996.
However, with the advent of the Asian financial crisis and its contagion effects on Russia and Latin
America, portfolio flows shrank quickly to $30 billion in 1997 and to $14 billion in 1998. Given
the highly volatile and destabilizing movements in short-term capital flows, developing countries
were forced to ask themselves the question: Are the benefits of capital account liberalization
worth the costs and risks? The World Bank’s most recent World Development Report emphasizes
the following four key components of carefully calibrated integration into world capital markets
(World Bank, 1999: 69-70).
• Developing countries need to strengthen banking regulations and, where possible, build
complementary and well-regulated securities markets.
• Policies should be directed to reducing the demand for—and volatility of—short-term
foreign borrowing.
• Further international cooperation is needed in setting and implementing fiscal, monetary,
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• Long-term foreign investment should be attracted by cultivating a healthy economic
environment—including investing in human capital, allowing domestic markets to work
without unnecessary distortions, and committing to a strong regime of investors’ rights
and obligations—and not by offering subsidies or other inducements.
Private capital flows, particularly short-term flows, are volatile, but FDI has been rising steadily
given the irreversible extension of global production/distribution networks of MNEs (Figure 10).
In light of the current state of financial sector development in most parts of Africa, the most
desired private capital inflows are FDIs. This paper, therefore, turns to the analysis of FDI in the
next section.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)5
Trends and Issues
Developing Asia (East and South-East Asia) has become the fourth growth pole of the world
economy during the past decade. With a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) attracted
from Japan and other developed economies in addition to its rapidly-growing intra-regional FDIs,
the region has accomplished FDI-supported export-led growth. The recent Asian financial crisis
emerged in 1997 after a rapid intake of debt-creating indirect financial inflows reconfirmed the
importance of FDI for a sound buildup of productive capacity and sustained growth. FDI recipient
economies in developing Asia observed an expansion in the stock of productive capital and
experienced accelerated growth in their income and foreign trade.
Observed impacts of FDI in recipient economies are multi-dimensional phenomena.  FDI
does not only mean a simple cross-border transfer of productive capital stock (a traditional ‘transfer
problem’ in real resources) but also includes important international transfers to the recipient
enterprise of production and control technologies, and management resources including international
























































Figure 10.  Capital Flows to Developing Countries
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999.28 Shigeru Otsubo
industrial sectors has also been observed. The resultant increases in productivity and in the rate of
return on investment provide new incentives for additional domestic savings and investment.  These
increases in savings and in gross investment over and above initial FDI are called the ‘cofinance
effects’ of FDI, and have been widely observed in China and other developing Asian economies.
With regard to the costs and benefits of FDI, the majority of existing pro- as well as anti-
arguments as summarized in Lall (1974), Tanaka (1994), and Caves, et al. (1996), are either non-
economic or economic but short-term, partial-equilibrium arguments.  For instance, ‘nationalist’,
‘dependence’, and ‘balance of payments’ approaches in the analysis of impacts on FDI recipients,
and ‘technology-nationalist’, ‘employment’, and ‘balance of payments’ approaches and impacts
on FDI suppliers fall into these categories. These arguments also often misconstrue the proper
sequence of causes and effects of FDI. ‘Industry hollowing-out’ and ‘exporting employment’
arguments for FDI suppliers are the representative cases. As noted by Graham and Krugman
(1989) and Tanaka (1994), FDI, as a micro phenomenon, should not be blamed for negative
macro outcomes, such as a worsening trade balance, that in principle is a reflection of a country’s
savings-investment imbalance. Macro impacts of FDI, therefore, should only emerge through
changes in savings-investment behavior triggered by this transfer of productive resources and
technology. Sekiguchi (1988) and Graham and Krugman (1989) properly assert that these long-
run effects of FDI should be separated from the short-term effects, and they should be evaluated
in a general-equilibrium framework.
Analysis of flow impacts of FDI such as the dynamics of export-import trade flows after FDI
are evaluated by Kojima (1973), Kawai and Urata (1995), Wei and Frankel (1997), Otsubo and
Umemura (1998), and Nakamura and Oyama (1998). In addition to these flow impacts, stock
impacts such as: 1) a capacity and output expansion in the recipient economies though an increased
capital stock, matched by a reduced capital stock in supplier countries (stock effects); 2) an
increase in productivity through technology transfer (technology effects); and 3) an increase in
domestic investment supported by a higher rate of return on capital and larger domestic savings
(cofinance effects) should be taken into consideration. FDI is a positive-sum game.
FDI activities expanded rapidly on a global scale during the latter half of the 1980s. Flow
statistics of FDI from the IMF show that the world’s total amount of FDI grew from less than $60
billion in 1985 to $240 billion in 1990, and to about $300 billion in 1995 (Tables 11 and 12). The
total amount of annual global FDI flows thus expanded more than 5 times during that decade.
World trade expanded by only 2.7 times during the same period. Factors underlying this rapid
expansion in global FDI were the developments in the world economy after the Plaza accord.
These include a large-scale adjustment in exchange rates, a world-wide business-cycle expansion,
a GATT/WTO-led systematic deregulation in cross-border transactions in goods and capital, wide-
spread liberalization and market-orientation among developing and former communist countries,
and a resurgence in regional economic/trading arrangements.
By examining the geographical distribution of global FDI, one notices an increasing importance
of developing Asia. Developing Asia as a recipient of FDI increased its share in the world from 9
percent in 1985 to 20 percent in 1995. Major factors underlying this development were not only
changes in the global economic environment but more importantly the structural adjustments in
Asian economies including a liberalization of trade and financial flows—a sweeping shift in their
development strategy from import-substitution to an FDI-led export-promotion. Compared to
other developing regions, Asia abounds in a cheap and educated workforce. In addition, given an
expansion of its middle class due to sustained high growth, Asian markets have grown enough to
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Table 11.  Outward FDI by Major Countries  (ΒΟΠ−βασε   φ λ οωσ)
(US$ million)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
ΥΣΑ 13,170 18,690 31,040 17,880 36,832 29,951 31,378 42,660 78,172 54,465 95,530
Canada 3,072 3,863 7,746 5,766 4,587 4,725 5,655 3,635 5,825 7,447 5,761
EU 26,459 48,029 71,120 92,856 111,536 132081 106,109 108,957 96,009 111,610 134,373
U.K. 10,643 17,577 31,446 37,314 35,484 19,323 16,307 18,991 25,516 28,284 40,325
Germany 5,933 10,506 9,197 12,702 15,261 24,195 23,719 19,667 15,275 16,689 34,894
Νετηερλ ανδσ 2,693 4,228 8,788 6,772 14,893 15,388 13,565 14,257 11,708 16,738 12,060
Βελ γιυµ,
Λυξεµβουργ
296 1,723 2,782 3,784 6,486 6,314 6,271 11,407 4,904 588 -
Φρανχε 2,243 5,403 9,210 14,496 19,498 34,823 23,932 31,269 20,605 22,801 18,734
Ιταλ ψ 1,874 2,696 2,362 5,576 2,160 7,394 6,928 6,502 9,271 5,639 6,926
Σπαιν 250 378 745 1,235 1,473 3,522 4,442 2,192 2,652 3,831 3,574
Σωεδεν 1,805 3,723 4,489 7,233 10,296 14,629 7,262 419 1,471 6,596 10,733
Σωιτζερλ ανδ 4,573 1,460 1,273 8,695 7,850 6,370 6,541 5,671 8,763 10,839 11,851
ϑαπ αν 6,450 14,480 19,520 34,210 44,160 48,050 31,487 17,358 13,826 18,101 22,664
Αυστραλ ια 1,879 3,327 4,998 4,983 3,372 185 3,022 854 1,733 5,686 4,948
ΑΣΙΑ 956 778 1,889 5,286 9,332 9,309 4,957 8,532 11,207 11,497 14,003
Σουτη Κορεα 34 110 183 151 613 1,056 1,500 1,208 1,361 2,524 3,529
Σινγαπορε 238 181 206 117 882 2,034 526 1,317 2,021 3,104 3,906
Χηινα 628 450 645 850 780 830 913 4,000 4,400 2,000 2,000
Μαλ αψσια -----------
Πηιλιππινεσ -------- 3 7 4 3 0 2 3 9 9
Τηαιλ ανδ 1 1 170 24 50 140 167 147 233 493 886
Ινδονεσια -------- 3 5 6 6 0 9 6 0 3
Ωορλ δ Τοταλ 58,292 93,767 139,629 171,567 222,883 235,321 193,379 190,481 221,873 227,725 297,264
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook
Table 12.  Inward FDI by Major Countries  (ΒΟΠ−βασε   φ λ οωσ)
(US$ million)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
ΥΣΑ 19,030 34,080 58,140 59,420 67,730 47,918 22,010 17,580 43,014 49,760 60,230
Canada -1,773 1,217 4,198 3,795 5,029 7,855 2,740 4,517 4,997 7,299 10,786
EU 17,112 21,284 37,306 56,558 80,739 97,887 78,723 83,729 79,937 69,579 110,927
U.K. 4,732 7,309 14,106 18,263 30,553 32,427 16,213 16,135 15,544 10,295 32,208
Germany 2,722 722 1,490 875 7,152 2,532 4,108 2,642 1,818 815 8,938
Νετηερλ ανδσ 1,374 3,514 2,891 5,037 8,563 12,349 6,316 7,790 7,661 5,616 10,228
Βελ γιυµ,
Λυξεµβουργ
1,051 730 2,355 5,212 7,020 8,047 9,363 11,286 10,750 7,464 -
Φρανχε 2,595 3,256 5,140 8,487 10,304 13,183 15,153 21,840 20,754 16,628 23,735
Ιταλ ψ 1,067 -153 4,188 6,789 2,166 6,411 2,401 3,950 4,383 2,163 4,879
Σπαιν 1,968 3,451 4,571 7,021 8,428 13,984 12,493 13,276 8,144 9,359 6,250
Σωεδεν 393 942 578 1,514 1,812 1,982 6,351 -5 3,705 6,241 14,273
Σωιτζερλ ανδ 1,267 2,122 2,320 405 2,827 4,961 3,178 1,249 899 4,104 2,600
ϑαπ αν 640 230 1,170 -520 -1,060 1,760 1,298 2,761 126 916 56
Αυστραλ ια 2,063 3,484 3,899 7,715 8,129 6,482 4,037 5,038 3,008 4,708 13,710
ΑΣΙΑ 4,863 5,720 8,510 12,735 14,269 18,421 20,779 25,597 44,970 52,515 63,223
Σουτη Κορεα 234 435 601 871 1,118 788 1,180 727 588 809 1,776
Σινγαπορε 1,047 1,710 2,836 3,655 2,887 5,575 4,887 2,204 4,686 5,480 6,912
Χηινα 1,659 1,875 2,314 3,194 3,393 3,487 4,366 11,156 27,515 33,787 35,849
Μαλ αψσια 695 489 423 719 1,668 2,332 3,998 5,183 5,006 4,348 5,800
Πηιλιππινεσ 12 127 307 936 563 530 544 228 1,238 1,591 1,478
Τηαιλ ανδ 163 263 352 1,105 1,775 2,444 2,014 2,113 1,804 1,366 2,068
Ινδονεσια 310 258 385 576 682 1,093 1,482 1,777 2,004 2,109 4,348
Ωορλ δ Τοταλ 50,975 76,052 122,175 150,449 193,826 201,230 153,840 165,862 210,272 230,953 316,441
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook30 Shigeru Otsubo
Theories on Determinants and Impacts of FDI
Economic impacts of FDI consist largely of two components: those resulting from the transfer
of productive resources and those based on a redistribution of managerial resources. Although
factor price equalization should materialize through free trade, if factor endowments widely vary
among countries, trade does not equalize rewards to productive factors, and cross-border
movements of productive resources are triggered.  Furthermore, if restrictions on trade exist, they
provide strong incentives for factors to move globally. This section reviews some of the major
theories and arguments for determinants and impacts of FDI.
MacDougall (1960) draws on a basic framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and shows
that from the initial condition of different capital endowments, capital moves from a capital-rich
country to a capital-scarce country until the return on capital is equalized. This efficient allocation
of capital across countries increases national income in both supplier and recipient countries. In a
supplier country, capital income increases while labor income declines as a result of this capital
transfer. In a recipient country, capital income declines while labor income increases. Sekiguchi
(1988) modifies the MacDougall model by adding a technology advance—one that distinguishes
FDI from indirect investment—in the recipient country and shows that labor in the supplier country
suffers as a consequence of this technology transfer. These are in principle short-term partial-
equilibrium analyses. They do not explain FDIs for the horizontal division of production processes,
either.
Agarwal (1980) and Lizondo (1991) review more recent theories and determinants of FDI
and available empirical studies to determine the validity of these theories. Lizondo (1991) presents
‘differential rates of return’, ‘portfolio diversification’, and ‘market size’ arguments as theories of
FDI based on an assumption of perfect markets. The ‘differential rates of return’ approach states
that FDI flows from countries with low rates of return to those with higher rates of return. The
‘portfolio diversification’ argument focuses on the role of risk and captures FDIs as a behavior of
risk diversification. ‘Market size’ indicates potential sales, and therefore, attracts FDI if the market
is perfect and transaction costs are not involved. However, as Lizondo (1991) states, the
‘differential rates of return’ approach does not explain two-way flows of FDIs, nor does the
‘portfolio diversification’ argument account for the observed differential tendencies of industries
to engage in FDIs. Lastly, the ‘market size’ argument lacks any strong theoretical background.
As a hypothesis that mainly deals with industrialized countries’ FDI to developing countries,
the ‘Kojima hypothesis’ is worth noting. Kojima (1973, 1985) argues that FDIs are welfare-
improving in both supplier and recipient countries if the FDIs are trade-oriented and allocated
along the line of comparative advantage. However, this hypothesis, too, assumes a perfect market.
For more realistic arguments based on imperfect markets, there are static approaches such
as ‘industrial organization’ theory, ‘internalization’ theory, an ‘eclectic approach’, and more dynamic
approaches such as ‘product cycle’ theory and the theory of ‘oligopolistic reaction’. The ‘industrial
organization’ approach by Hymer (1976) argues that for firms to operate in a foreign land with
locational disadvantages, they must have some firm-specific advantages such as marketing and
managerial skills and/or a brand name that eliminates or lessens competition. Graham and Krugman
(1989) show the validity of this approach in explaining inward FDIs in the United States. Coase
(1937) presented that market transaction costs were the very reason for a firm’s existence. The
‘internalization’ approach of FDI asserts that FDI is an act of internalization of costly market
transactions. Rugman (1980) argues the general validity of this approach, while Buckley (1988)
examines the testability of this hypothesis.  Dunning (1977, 1979, 1988) presents OLI (ownership,Linking Africa to a Changing World 31
location, and internalization) theory as an ‘eclectic approach’. In analyzing prerequisites for FDI
to take place, Dunning asserts that a firm should have a firm-specific advantage (ownership), a
locational advantage to mobilize this firm-specific know-how (location), and an incentive to
internalize external transactions (internalization). The product cycle theory by Vernon (1966, 1979)
asserts that the pressure of exclusion in a maturing domestic market triggers FDI. The ‘oligopolistic
reaction’ hypothesis by Knickerbocker (1973) states that oligopolistic behavior explains a series
of successive investments after one firm’s FDI in a local market. Kawaguchi (1994) surveys the
factors of Japanese firms engaging in FDI and finds strong validity in this ‘oligopolistic reaction’
among Japanese MNEs.
Helpman (1984) extends a general equilibrium model of international trade as a theoretical
model of FDIs by MNEs that produce differentiated products in a number of countries. Horstmann
and Markusen (1987) model a substitution between trade and FDI by incorporating firm-specific
assets, transaction costs, and firm-level economies of scale. Other prominent studies on MNEs
and FDI include Meier (1968), Streeten (1973), Caves (1982), and Blomström and Zejan (1991).
As influential factors in FDI decisions, the possible effects of various government regulations on
FDI flows are summarized in OECD (1989). This paper deals with the policy issues in Section 4.
Costs and Benefits of FDI
Lall (1974), Tanaka (1994), and Caves et al. (1996) present lists regarding costs and benefits
of FDI. As discussed in the earlier section, cited effects of FDIs are largely short-term oriented
and partial-equilibrium oriented. On the technology-transfer effects and productivity spillovers of
FDI, Blomström (1991) reviews relevant concepts and related empirical studies. He introduces
the channels in which intra-industry spillovers may occur, such as increased competition, the training
of labor and management, and the MNE’s role of speeding up technology transfer. Blomström
argues the other major aspect of technology transfer is inter-industry spillovers that occur through
backward and forward linkages of industries. For representative empirical studies on this issue of
technology transfer, see Blomström (1983, 1989) on Mexico, Aitken and Harrison (1991) on
Venezuela, Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco, Okamoto (1994) on Malaysia, Rao and
Thangavelu (1998) on Singapore, and Sjöholm (1998) on Indonesia.
On macro impacts of FDI, results from macroeconometric analyses by Fry (1993) show
that, unlike Latin American cases, FDIs in Asia lead to a direct expansion of productive stock,
and rates of domestic savings and investment tend to increase together with an inflow of FDI
(‘cofinance effects’). In Latin America, FDI is mainly used in order to fill balance-of-payment
gaps, and is often associated with privatization of state-owned enterprises where FDI takes the
form of a transfer of ownership without contributing to an expansion of real capital stock. Fry’s
finding of the increased rate of domestic savings in Asia rejects the implication drawn from the
MacDougall model.  In the framework of the MacDougall model, inter-sectoral transfer of income
from capitalists to laborers in an FDI-recipient economy should reduce the rate of domestic savings
provided that the capitalists’ saving propensity is higher than that of laborers.  Proper treatments
of macro outcomes (such as employment and balance of payments) of FDI—a microeconomic
behavior—are carefully argued in Graham and Krugman (1989).  There the importance of a general-
equilibrium approach in evaluating the impacts of FDI is stressed. Long-term endogenous changes
in the savings-investment balance triggered by capital inflows and technology transfers are the
keys to evaluating macro impacts properly.32 Shigeru Otsubo
If properly synthesized, a standard story that could be supported by the existing theoretical
literature and by empirical findings should be as follows. The FDI-related transfer of real capital,
technological, and managerial resources expands capital stock and productive capacity. It also
triggers technological progress and productivity increases. If the recipient economy has a
comparative advantage in relatively labor-intensive products, then the capital and technology go
to these labor-intensive sectors. Domestic resources are also absorbed into these sectors as the
rate of return to productive factors in these industries initially increases, resulting in increased
production, exports, and imports of complementary capital-intensive goods. Terms of trade worsen
in the FDI-recipient economy and improve in the FDI-supplier economy.  As such, trade-oriented
FDIs in developing countries should contribute to an increase in economic welfare and trade.
Changes in the supplier country’s employment situation should not be regarded as a consequence
of FDI, as this is dominated by supply-side phenomena in the supplier’s market. The employment
situation in the recipient developing economies should improve as these economies still possess
dualistic sectoral as well as labor-market structures, and FDI inflow creates new job opportunities.
Macro balance will be altered in the long run as savings-investment behavior changes in response
to the FDI in both the supplier and recipient economies.
The Marginalization of Africa
Trends—Marginalized and Delinked
Africa has been gradually but steadily marginalized in the rapidly globalizing world economy
in the last quarter of the 20th century. The marginalization of Africa is visible in its shares of exports
and output in the world and in the developing community as shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12,
respectively. Africa’s share in global exports fell from 4.5 percent in 1977 to 2 percent in 1997 (in
current dollar terms), in contrast with the fact that developing countries as a whole increased their
presence in world trade. Figure 12 illustrates Africa’s similarly sinking trade share in developing
regions, from 15.5 percent in 1981 to 9.2 percent in 1997. Africa’s trade share rapidly declined
after the start of the current wave of globalization when other regions of the world adopted integrative
strategies while Africa continued to stay inward-looking. During the 20 year period up to the mid-
1990s, the growth rate of per capita income for the top one-third export performers among
developing countries (average 10.2 percent real rate of export growth) was positive 1.9 percent.
The growth rates for the middle one-third (3.5 percent export growth) and the bottom one-third
(-3.2 percent) are negative 0.6 and negative 2.5 percent respectively. On average, exports worked
as the engine for growth. Reflecting the marginalization in world trade, Africa’s output share in the
world economy declined visibly from 3.1 percent in 1980 to 1.5 percent in 1996.
Africa’s share in global private capital flows also declined gradually up to the latter half of the
1980s, from which time the speed of marginalization in world investment accelerated visibly (Figure
13). With the collapse in oil prices in the first half of the 1980s, FDI flows to Africa halted almost
at once. Its share in the total FDI flows to developing countries in 1997 was 4.7 percent as
opposed to 23 percent in 1970. The only international economic dimension in which Africa has
become non-marginal is aid (Collier, 1995). Africa now receives about 40 percent of total official
net resource flows to the developing regions (Figure 13). The importance of aid flows is also
visible in Figure 14, if the composition of resource inflows is considered in comparison with that
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Figure 11:  Africa’s Declining Share of Exports and GDP in the World
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Figure 12:  Africa’s Declining Share of Exports and GDP
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Figure 13:  Africa’s Changing Shares in Resource Flows to the Developing Countries
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Figure 14. Net Resource Flows to Africa, 1970-1998
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999.Linking Africa to a Changing World 35
Africa’s trend of marginalization in the global economy represents a process of delinking
from the world economy. Figure 15 shows the annual average rate of changes in trade/GDP ratio
for the regions of the world economy for the periods of 1975-84 and 1985-94. With the
revolutionary shift in development strategy on the part of many developing countries noted earlier,
the process of trade integration has accelerated since the mid-1980s. In the second time period,
East Asia accelerated its already high pace of integration, and Latin America, having overcome
the debt crisis of the 1980s, reversed the process of disintegration into that of integration. Although
its pace of disintegration from the global economy has slowed, Sub-Saharan Africa has become
the only developing region still in the process of delinkage. Collier (1997) also notes that since
1970, Sub-Saharan African GDP has risen more rapidly than its trade, while in contrast, trade has
risen much more rapidly than GDP in Asia and Latin America over the same period. In addition,
Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) confirm that African policy makers have generally been more skeptical
about the value of opening up their economies, and the trade liberalization that has taken place in
Africa generally pales beside the sweeping trade reforms adopted during the past decade or so in
many Latin American countries as well as in most of the former centrally planned economies of

































Figure 15.  Changes in Trade/GDP Ratio
(annual average rate)
In terms of the FDI/GDP ratio, the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s contributed to the
decline of FDI into oil-producing economies of the Middle East and Africa, as noted earlier.
Furthermore, the ratio also declined for Sub-Saharan Africa if the comparison is made between
1981-83 and 1991-93. However, gradually turning this trend are recent FDI inflows to the following
four countries: Tunisia; Morocco; and South Africa, thanks to the ‘Association Agreements’ with
the EU (due to a heightened expectation for future exports to the Common Market); and Mauritius
thanks to phenomenal growth of its export processing zones (EPZs) (Figure 16). Nonetheless, as
noted above, considered size-wise ($7.6 billion net inflow in 1997), Africa’s intake of global FDI
has been marginalized.






























Figure 16. Gross FDI/GDP Ratio
 (period averages)
Note:  PPP GDP is used.
Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999.
Reasons Why?
Many critiques often cite a hostile global economic environment as a major factor in Africa’s
marginalization in world trade. It is true that Africa, like many other primary commodity exporters,
suffered from deterioration in terms of trade through the most part of the 1980s and 1990s.
However, it is also true that many former commodity-dependent exporters have grown out of that
monoculture through rigorous investment in the agricultural sector that secured productivity growth
and supported industrialization and diversification of the trade structure. A more relevant question
is: has Africa been systematically forced to operate under a restrictive trade environment?
Preferences are given to most developing countries by most developed economies under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Furthermore, many GSP schemes offer even lower
preferential tariffs to those designated as least developed countries (LDC) by the United Nations
classification of developing communities. Of 53 African countries, 32 qualify for this treatment.
They are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Congo, Dem. Rep., and Zambia.
On top of the GSP, the EU offers more preferential access to sixty-eight African, Caribbean, and
Pacific (ACP) developing countries¯which includes all Sub-Saharan countries under the Lomé
Convention (Lomé 4). Under the trade provisions in the Convention, the majority of ACP exports
are granted unrestricted access to the Common Market. (The current Convention is scheduled for
renewal in the year 2000.)
Ng and Yeats (1996) calculate the average margins that these tariff preferences provide
Sub-Saharan Africa in the EU, United States, and Japan. With three OECD markets combined,
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa enjoy preferential tariff margins of about 1 to 4.5 percent relative
to pre-Uruguay Round MFN tariffs. Looking at the three OECD regions separately, preferenceLinking Africa to a Changing World 37
margins are highest in the EU market given trade provisions of the Lomé Convention, ranging from
2 to 4 percentage points (with an exception of Swaziland’s 4.9 percent). The preference margins
in the US and Japanese markets range from 0 to 3 percent. With these computed figures, Ng and
Yeats (1996) conclude that there is no evidence that OECD tariffs caused the general loss of
competitive position reflected in Africa’s declining market shares. The evidence suggests that the
tariff treatment provided for Africa rather enhanced its competitive position vis-à-vis other exporters.
By examining coverage ratios of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) using the World Bank-UNCTAD
SMART database, the same authors find that only 10.8 percent of Sub-Saharan African non-fuel
exports face NTBs as opposed to the 16.6 percent average for all developing countries. The
lower NTB coverage ratio is largely accounted for by the fact that most African countries’ textile
and clothing products are not affected by Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) restrictions. Only 19
percent of African textile exports face NTBs, as opposed to 53 percent for such exports from all
developing countries combined, and an even larger discrepancy, the African coverage ratio for
clothing is about 18 points below the 63 percent developing country average. The authors then
examine Africa’s own trade barriers and find that Sub-Saharan Africa’s average tariff rate of 26.8
percent and NTB coverage ratio of 34.1 percent are considerably higher than those numbers for
a set of fast-growing exporters6 more than three times higher in average tariff, nine times higher in
NTB coverage. The authors conclude that Sub-Saharan Africa’s own high import barriers,
particularly to imports of key inputs for exports, are the main causes of Africa’s marginalization in
world trade.
Similar findings are made by Sachs and Warner (1996). Using an econometric analysis of
cross-country growth data, per capita growth is related to: 1) the initial income level of the country,
determining whether there are potential catch-up benefits; 2) the extent of overall market orientation,
including openness to trade; 3) the national saving rate; and 4) the geographic and resource structure
of the economy, with landlocked and resource-abundant economies tending to lag behind coastal
and resource-scarce ones. The study finds an overall shortfall of 4.5 percentage points in Africa’s
growth performance in 1970-89. Of this, the study attributes 1.8 points to lack of trade openness,
1.9 points to low savings rates, and 0.9 points to highly distorted domestic markets. Drawing on
an earlier paper that shows income convergence only among open economies (Sachs and Warner,
1995), Sachs and Warner (1996) conclude that successful growth will depend first and foremost
on economic integration with the rest of the world. Africa’s largely self-imposed exile from world
markets can end quickly by cutting import tariffs and ending export taxes on agricultural exports.
Dollar (1992), after examining evidence from 95 developing countries for the period 1976-
1985, also concludes that outward-oriented developing economies really do grow more rapidly.
Thus, this study also attributes Africa’s slow growth to its inward-orientation. The author states
that in Africa inward orientation results from exchange rates that are overvalued as a result of
protection (Dollar, 1992: 532). According to his estimates, the adoption of Asian-type outward-
oriented strategies, coupled with a stable real exchange rate, could have added 2.1 percentage
points to annual African growth over this period.
Harrison (1991), after evaluating a correlation between economic growth and various measures
of openness, also finds that growth is generally positively associated with openness. Nash and
Thomas (1991) show with empirical evidence that trade policy reforms in developing countries
can make an important contribution to industrialization and growth.
Using empirical results suggesting that Africa’s participation in international trade is ‘normal’
given its level of income, country size and geography, Rodrick (1998) argues that the marginalization
of Africa in world trade is entirely due to the slow growth of African economies. Using a gravity38 Shigeru Otsubo
model analysis of bilateral trade between Africa and industrialized countries, Coe and Hoffmaister
(1999) state that after controlling for the various determinants of bilateral trade—economic size,
distance, population, access to the sea, export composition, linguistic ties and the degree of
openness—Africa’s trade is not at all unusual. What is unusual is that Africa actually overtraded
with the North relative to other developing countries in the early 1970s, but the degree of overtrading
has steadily declined over the past 25 years. The authors state that this is one aspect of Africa’s
marginalization in international trade. Given that trade integration and economic growth are
simultaneous achievements in many successful integrators of Asia, and that industrial countries
have been wide open to Africa’s exports relative to those from other regions, the results of these
studies, too, indicate that the problem lies on the part of Africa in its restrictive import (openness)
and export policies.
Otsubo (1996b) describes episodes of Sub-Saharan African (and other regions’) trade and
foreign exchange reforms and resultant changes in speed of integration or disintegration. The trade
regimes of both African Financial Community (CFA) members and non-CFA members of Sub-
Saharan Africa before 1985 were characterized by the severity of quantitative restrictions covering
virtually all categories, and by high tariff rates that were probably largely redundant due to high
non-tariff barriers. Congo, Dem. Rep., Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania
(all non-CFA members), and particularly the latter three initiated their reforms by attempting to
reform the foreign exchange markets to correct highly overvalued currencies, as manifested in high
black market premiums. These countries all succeeded in reducing black market premiums, and
all except Malawi accomplished sustained real devaluation of their currencies. Except for Tanzania
and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), they all substantially reduced or eliminated quantitative
restrictions on imports. Tariff rates, however, were not touched. Although reversals of reform
have been frequent, Ghana, Madagascar, and Nigeria succeeded in attaining a positive rate of
trade integration after the reform, while Tanzania and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). at
least slowed the pace of separation from the world market. Kenya and Malawi, on the other hand,
either started to separate or increased the pace of separation from the world market. In the process,
Malawi experienced real appreciation while Kenya managed to produce only a negligible amount
of devaluation. In these economies, the rate of improvement in price distortions was much smaller
than in the other reformers. Overall, non-CFA sub-Saharan Africa was barely able even to slow
the process of isolation from the world market after the mid-1980s. Turning to the other countries,
the CFA failed to devalue their currencies during the 1980s or to carry out other trade reforms,
only to realize the need for substantial devaluation in 1994. A moderate trend increase in the trade
integration ratio is now expected for this group of CFA members due to the positive effects from
the 1994 initiatives.
As most MNEs engage in international trade both in inputs and outputs, any restrictions on
the cross-border flows of goods and services will discourage inward FDI. Also, as payments on
cross-border trade and returns on investment, including profit repatriation for FDIs, have to be
paid in a hard currency, any restrictions on foreign exchange transactions will be equally detrimental
to international capital flows. The 1996 issue of the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects,
featuring disparities in global integration, used country credit ratings by institutional investors as
one of the indicators for the degree of integration. Risk perceptions of international investors are
important determinants of capital inflows and outflows, as investors have become more and more
discerning as noted earlier. Investors are looking not only at macroeconomic fundamentals such as
fiscal and balance of payments imbalances and monetary instability, but also at institutional
fundamentals such as government and judicial systems, and systems of economic and monetary
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Collier (1995) enlists four explanations for Africa’s marginalization in trade and investment:
insufficient reform; insufficient scale; high risk; and weak restraints. Africa has simply not adopted
sufficient economic reform according to the assertions made in Collier’s piece, as well as many
other writings, including those in Adjustment in Africa (World Bank, 1994b). Collier (1995)
states that until the late 1980s it was straightforward to explain Africa’s marginalization in terms of
domestic policies which were hostile both to the private sector in general and to the export sector
and foreign capital in particular. While the reform efforts since the 1980s somewhat reduced the
gap (in treatment of private and foreign investors and manufacturers) between Africa and the rest
of the world, the gap persists and it continues to haunt Africa in its quest for integration. (This
paper visits the issue of policy reforms under globalization in Section 4.)
Borrowing ideas from Krugman’s notion of low-level equilibrium traps in endogenous growth
models (Krugman, 1991), Collier (1995) presents insufficient scale and low-level traps as the
second reason for Africa’s marginalization. Regarding economies of scale, there are two types:
those external to the individual firm, and those internalized within the firm in the production and
supply of inputs as agglomeration proceeds. However, due to Africa being in a low-level trap with
little manufacturing located in the continent, firms there cannot reap the positive effects of
agglomeration. Transport costs influence the location decisions of firms, and the detrimental effects
of high transport costs in Africa are cited by many studies including Global Economic Prospects
1996 (World Bank, 1996) and Sachs (1996). The Global Economic Prospects 1996 shows that
in fiscal 1991, sub-Saharan Africa’s net freight and insurance payments were $3.9 billion, or 15
percent of total exports, compared with 5.8 percent for all developing countries. The report
attributes these high transportation costs to anticompetitive cargo reservation policies that many
African countries adopted in the past, attempting to develop national fleets.
As the third of the four reasons of marginalization, Collier (1995) points out a high-risk
business environment in most parts of Africa. The majority of African countries are subject to two
types of high risks: policy changes and shocks. Many African governments often change not only
economic policies but also policy rules themselves, making investment decisions difficult. Africa
has often been subject to terms-of-trade shocks, anomalous weather conditions, and incidences
in neighboring economies that abruptly change the structure of relative prices, again making
investment plans riskier if not impossible.
Collier (1995) cites a lack of ‘agencies of restraint’ as his last, but not least important factor
in the marginalization of Africa. North (1990) shows that, historically development has required a
reduction in transaction costs and that this reduction is in turn dependent upon institutional
innovations such as a reliable legal system. Collier (1995) states that in Africa both the civil and
legal system and the audit system have deteriorated (since independence) and that this deterioration
of the judicial and accountancy professions in Africa weakens or removes the key agencies of
restraint which private agents use for asset transactions.
In summary, the process of Africa’s marginalization in the global economy can only be stopped
and reversed if Africa works on a reform agenda, particularly liberalization of trade and creation
of an investment-friendly institutional environment, in order to stop the process of disintegration
and start linking with rapidly globalizing world markets.40 Shigeru Otsubo
Preference Erosion?
Will Africa be further marginalized given the so-called preference erosion under the GATT
Uruguay Round? Will Africa have to fight its way to the global market in an increasingly hostile
economic environment? Offering a partial answer to these questions, Oyejide (1998) states that
the Uruguay Round agreements, when fully implemented, will significantly reduce general trade
barriers, and the resulting tariff reductions will, no doubt, erode the preferential tariff margins
currently enjoyed by many African countries.
In the African context, possible erosions in the preference margins extended to Africa under
the GSP and the Lomé Convention are of vital concern. The benefits of the GSP are widespread
but shallow (World Bank, 1995: 38). GSP schemes impose tight rules of origin, exclude critical
sectors such as foods and textiles from preferences, and constrain other sectors with quotas.
Preferences are unilateral concessions and may be withdrawn at any time, particularly if the
exporters fail the so-called ‘competitive need’ test. UNCTAD (1994) estimates that approximately
51.6 percent of developing countries’ exports of products subject to OECD MFN duties are
afforded preferences under the GSP. However, only about 50 percent of GSP eligible products
actually receive this treatment for various reasons such as preference ceilings or rules of origin.
This implies that only about one-quarter of developing countries’ exports of goods subject to
MFN duties actually enjoy preferential treatment under GSP schemes (Page and Davenport, 1994).
The Lomé Convention provides by far the most favorable system of preferences for African
(and other ACP) countries in terms of preference margins granted and scope of exports covered
(Oyejide, 1998: 131). They are contractual in the sense of being mutually agreed upon between
the EU and its ACP partners, and they cannot be unilaterally modified or abrogated by the EU.
Lomé trade preferences are meant to provide security of access for ACP exports to EU markets
and thus reduce some of the inherent risks involved in investing in export-oriented activities in sub-
Saharan countries.
Yeats (1994) estimates that complete liberalization of MFN tariffs in the EU would generate
total trade losses of over US$250 million in Africa. For the 30 major SSA exporters, however,
these losses would represent only as much as 2 percent of their current export revenues. Complete
liberalization of MFN tariffs in the US and Japanese markets is estimated to be much less detrimental
to Sub-Saharan Africa, with additional trade losses of only $14.3 million.
Harrold (1995) states that the estimated negative effects on Africa should be much smaller.
Manufactures trade that the Round covers constitute only a small proportion of Africa’s exports,
and preferential tariff margins on these products are already small. He estimates a trade loss of
US$7.5 million in the OECD markets, with more than 70 percent of the loss incurred in the EU
market, but a gain of $3.8 million in the US market due to wider access for textiles and clothing
exports.
Using some simple market-by-market estimates of the extent of GSP and Lomé preferences,
similar conclusions are drawn by Lall (1994). He notes that since the least developed countries
export mostly goods with relatively low MFN tariffs, preference margins offer at most a 3 to 4
percent price advantage relative to other suppliers. The least-developed countries in Africa as a
whole turn out to be the loser again among the developing regions according to his computations.
While the least-developed countries in Asia gain $38.4 million (with a gain of $36.4 in the US
market, a gain of $2.8 million in Japan, and a loss of $0.8 million in the EU market), those in Africa
are estimated to suffer a loss of $7.7 million (with a loss of $5.5 million in the EU, a loss of $6.5
million in Japan, but a gain of $4.2 million in the US market). However, the estimated loss is again
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Hertel et al. (1995), using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) applied general
equilibrium multi-region multi-sector model, estimate the welfare impact of abolishing the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in the year 2005. They state that about 20 percent of the total welfare
gains from the Uruguay Round are accounted for by the phasing out of the MFA. According to
their simulation results, the more efficient suppliers of textiles and clothing in ASEAN, South Asia,
and China will gain, while less efficient suppliers in Africa and higher-cost suppliers in Latin America
and among the NIEs will lose. As Table 13 shows, MFA quotas impose far less restrictions on
African than on Asian exporters. In fact, Africa’s MFA quotas actually restrict only three countries:
Kenya, Egypt and Mauritius, although a threat of new restrictions for more African exporters
remains as they become ‘competitive’. Given this structure of MFA quotas, exporters in Asia will
naturally gain relative to those in Africa.
Table 13:  MFA Quota Premia on Textile and Apparel Trade by Region
Importer
European Union (EU15) North America (NAFTA)
Exporter 1992 2005 1992 2005
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 4 4
Middle East and North Africa 0 0 8 8
Latin America 14 17 16 16
Economies in Transition 0 0 10 10
South Asia 21 25 22 25
East Asia High Income 12 12 14 14
East Asia Low Income 25 30 26 31
Rest of the World 0 0 6 6
Note: Data shown are tariff-equivalent percentages of fob value.
Source: Hertel, Masters and Elbehri (1998), Table 4.
Hertel, Masters and Elbehri (1998) simulate the welfare effects of the Uruguay Round, including
the phase-out of the MFA, using the same GTAP model. Their results confirm that Africa is likely
to be the only major region of the world to lose from the Uruguay Round implementation. The
same study, however, finds that any negative effects of the Uruguay Round can easily be outweighed
by the potential gains from catching up with other low-income countries in terms of agricultural
productivity and reduced transport costs.
The World Bank asked several economic model builders (for the OECD, the World Bank,
and GATT) to estimate the effects of the GATT Uruguay Round under various assumptions with
regard to markets’ competitive structure and economies of scale. According to the World Bank
report, the model simulation analyses suggest, overall, substantial gains for developing countries
as a whole and for the major developing-country regions. Only for Africa is there a divided
assessment, with the RUNS (OECD/World Bank) model and the BANK (the World Bank) model
suggesting small losses, and the GATT model suggesting a moderate gain (World Bank, 1995).
In conclusion, the same World Bank report finds that the two areas of major concern for
least-developed countries during the negotiations, i.e. preference erosion and higher food import
costs, are unlikely to cause significant adjustment strains, as noted in Section 2.3 (World Bank,42 Shigeru Otsubo
1995: Ch. 2). Any losses are likely to be small and easily outweighed by improvements in domestic
efficiency and gains derived from other aspects of the Round, such as improved security of market
access.
In summary, in the African context, preference erosion will most likely occur due to the
Uruguay Round negotiations and implementation, as many models simulate. One should not forget,
though, that the predicted negative effects do not come only from preference erosion but also
from Africa’s relative lack of liberalization vis-à-vis other developing regions that actively
participated in the Round. The predicted small negative repercussions should easily be outweighed
by the gains from pursuing further liberalization in trade and cutting costs associated with trade,
such as transportation costs and the costs of distorted resource allocation that bad policies produce.
Linking Africa to a Changing World
Policy and Reform Agenda under Globalization
In order for a country to successfully cope with and take advantage of rapidly globalizing
world markets, it has to work on a reform agenda both at the border and in the domestic market.
The current wave of globalization proceeds mainly in four spheres: goods and services transactions,
financial transactions, labor movements, and corporate activities. Therefore, if it wishes to
successfully integrate into the global economy, a country must reform systems and structures
pertaining to these spheres of economic activities in search of a stable, transparent, and fair market
system with efficient and proper government involvement. Figure 17 summarizes these reform
agenda in relation to markets (goods, services, capital, and labor markets) and economic agents
(government, producers, consumers, and foreign economies).
Globalization proceeds, first and foremost, through liberated and open cross-border
transactions of goods and services. In this context, trade barriers tariffs and non-tariff barriers
alike¯should be abolished or reduced. As shown in Section 3, the fact that Africa lags in trade
liberalization in comparison to the other developing regions is the fundamental cause of Africa’s
marginalization in the global economy. The lack of trade liberalization even within Africa’s regional
integration schemes explains the mediocre performance of these regional initiatives. Africa must
open up to integrate itself into a rapidly globalizing world economy.
As shown in Figure 17, liberalization brings benefits of increased variety to Africa’s consumers.
However, pressures to restructure domestic industry and markets come with this liberalization.
Industrial structure will be forced to change in accordance with the economy’s comparative
advantage. This requires relocation of the labor force again in line with comparative advantage. In
order for a country to absorb this transition with relatively low costs (transitional costs), the labor
market should be made flexible. It is therefore often said that labor market reform should proceed
with, or preferably precede, trade liberalization.
Where trade and industry are concerned, the trend of discussions within concerned multilateral
institutions such as the WTO and the OECD has shifted from border issues to differences in the
systems and practices employed in various countries, an indication of the growing awareness of
the links between trade and other policies. Harmonization of standards and certification with
international standards, as well as mutual approval, are desirable for fostering production and
expanded trade because they give birth to economies of scale. Where trade and competition are
concerned, the belief is that unless action is taken on non-tariff barriers in the broad sense of the
word, like the non-tariff barriers to trade erected by governments, or enterprises’ exclusionaryFigure 17.  Reform Agenda under Globalization
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business practices, the playing field will not be level and the effects of tariff liberalization will be
weakened. However, although countries are beginning to believe that trade policies, which are
based on national boundaries, should be abandoned because they distort the market mechanism,
there are divergent views on competition policies, which are domestically based. It is not certain
that harmonizing competition policies can bring about desirable conditions for competition. The
same uncertainty applies to whether countries should achieve a desirable state of competition
through administrative measures, as well as whether the system should also include criminal
provisions. Accordingly, it is important to focus on the effects the measures actually have, rather
than be distracted by system harmonization as a formality. In the African context, where the market
system is not yet well established, and where non-tariff barriers often nullify the effects of cutting
(binding) tariff rates, practical measures should be taken to reduce the effective rate of entry
deterrence. State monopolies in production and marketing of key products should be avoided so
that private sector activities can be fostered.
Globalization has an impact on domestic systems and policies that had heretofore been
considered autonomous. It is now widely known from an observation of cross-country data that
the per capita amount of general government expenditure and the levels of globalization tend to be
negatively correlated. In other words, with increased integration into global markets, per capita
general government expenditure tends to fall. However, this does not mean that more globalization
will result in smaller government. It only shows that the pressure for smaller government and the
forces for increasing globalization may share some common elements. Generally speaking,
globalization tends to shift the taxable base from highly mobile enterprises to less mobile individuals.
The system of taxing asset transactions and corporate earnings loses its autonomy in each country
as both more enterprises become multinational, and harmonization with systems in other countries
entailing a high degree of economic cohesiveness becomes necessary. As a result, globalization
heightens the need for efficient government that does not discourage active economic participation
by levying a high individual tax burden. In order not to increase the tax burden even when the
individual tax dependency rate rises, a more efficient government must be created by reforming
the social security program and trimming government administration. In the African context where
dependence on border tariffs and duties is still high for generating government revenue, a prudent
and forward-looking tax reform is imperative as liberalization in goods and service trade proceeds
and tariff revenues fall. Reform and privatization of inefficient state owned enterprises are also
high priorities in this respect.
Introduced in Section 3 as a major cause of the marginalization of Africa, Collier (1995)
states that until the late 1980s it was straightforward to explain Africa’s marginalization in terms of
domestic policies which were hostile both to the private sector in general and to the export sector
and foreign capital in particular. These policies had roots in the de-colonization process, when
African governments were inspired to Africanize productive assets, at times by uncompensated
nationalizations, and other times by more indirect measures of favoring African-owned competitors.
Unlike in Asia, ethnic minority groups that have business expertise and investment funds were not
allowed to actively participate in economic activities, nor were foreign private companies. Collier
(1995) says that a reversal of the marginalization of Africa will depend upon the performance of
ethnic minorities and foreign firms. Promoting competition and executing regulatory reforms to
create an environment conducive to the growth of the private sector, including ethnic-minority
firms and foreign companies, are high up on the reform agenda. Parastatal enterprises established
in the nationalization process at the time of de-colonization should give way to the private sector.
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In fostering private sector activities, it is imperative that the government see to the efficient provision
of public services and social infrastructure, as well as tax reductions on corporate activities. Due
to the nature of production-location decision-making on the part of multinational corporations, a
partial reduction in the anti-private-sector biases is not enough for a country to invite multinational
enterprises with accompanying FDIs. As discussed in Section 3, the existence of any gaps relative
to the other developing regions is detrimental, and therefore biases against private sector activities
should be totally removed whenever possible.
In order to draw in foreign private capital to finance accelerated economic growth, on top of
an elimination of Africa’s existent anti-private-sector, anti-foreign-firms biases, domestic financial
sector reform, and particularly financial regulatory reforms, are necessary. Various theories and
possible determinants of FDI were discussed in Section 2.6.2. Generally speaking, however,
attracting capital inflows and FDIs in particular requires reductions in investment risks perceived
by international investors. As noted in Section 3.2, risk perceptions by investors are important
determinants of capital inflows and outflows. Country and policy risks that go beyond normal
business and commercial risks are strong deterrents to foreign investors. Discerning investors are
looking not only at macroeconomic fundamentals such as fiscal and balance of payments imbalances
and monetary instability, but also at institutional fundamentals such as government and judicial
systems, and systems of economic and monetary regulations and monitoring. In particular, regulatory
reforms in the financial sector in order to establish fair and transparent capital/financial markets
are the key to financial integration and stability. Key components of carefully calibrated integration
into world capital markets were discussed in Section 2.5. However, these strategies for financial
sector development work well if and only if they are supported by stable and predictable policies.
Frequent and abrupt policy reversals prevalent in many African economies prohibit any
advancement in the continent’s integration into the global financial markets. Establishing so-called
‘agencies of restraint’ both at macro policy and at financial sector levels should prove highly
productive in pursuit of financial integration. The role of regional supra-national entities such as
regional integration schemes and regional central banks in provision of ‘agencies of restraint’ at a
macro level will be discussed later. At a sectoral level, creation and reforms in regulatory framework
such as banking regulations, securities exchange regulations, and creation of autonomous regulatory
bodies, should be on the reform agenda. Independence of central banks is another key area of
reform for many African countries.
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Johng-wha Lee (1998) find that countries with low levels of
education and low rates of foreign direct investment grow much more slowly than countries with
high education rates and high levels of inflow. Investing in human capital, by raising the expected
rate of return on investment, is conducive to creating an FDI friendly environment. An educated
workforce can, in turn, absorb production and managerial technology from foreign companies,
and thus contribute to an increase in general productivity of the host economy.
The World Bank, citing a study by Moran (1999), asserts that FDIs induced by distortive
policies such as trade protection against imports that compete with the goods produced by foreign
investors and financial inducements, such as subsidies and tax holidays, are welfare-reducing (World
Bank, 1999). FDIs are sensitive to political risks and costs associated with corruptive government
procedures. Property rights for FDI-related foreign establishments should also be guaranteed,
preferably by a transparent legal framework. Introduced as factors of Africa’s marginalization in
Section 3.2, any restrictions on the cross-border flows of goods and services and on foreign
exchange transactions will discourage inward FDIs.46 Shigeru Otsubo
In summary, long-term foreign investment such as FDIs should be attracted by reforms that
cultivate a healthy economic environment—including investing in human capital, allowing domestic
markets to work without unnecessary distortions, committing to a strong regime of investors’
rights and obligations, and liberalizing international trade and foreign exchange transactions—and
not by offering subsidies or other distortive inducements. In the African context, an inducement
package including tax-free export processing zones (EPZs) is still a viable option in the short run.
However, Africa should also aim for long-term reform and the policy agenda enumerated above.
Those reforms will prove to be conducive to growth in domestic industries as well.
Lastly, policies with regard to labor migration have to be considered. At some point in the
process of integration, a country that succeeds in the reform agenda under globalization will face
a pressure of inward migration of workers from neighboring economies. The majority of developed
and more advanced developing countries have adopted a strategic labor migration policy. By
carefully avoiding an influx of unskilled workers, these countries try to avoid negative impacts on
wages and employment, and to avoid pressure for fiscal expansion caused by higher demand for
social welfare payments. In Africa’s case, with a much smaller skilled and educated labor force,
including entrepreneurs, line managers, legal professionals, accountants, and administrative staff,
some sort of regional integration schemes may have to be considered in pursuit of a strategic labor
migration policy. Cross-border movements of other (lower-skilled) labor may instead have some
merits in the African context in conjunction with cross-border initiatives. In any event, countries
should plan ahead.
The Role of Regional Integration in Linking
Following the general description of trends and prospects of trade regionalization in Section
2.4, this section of the paper revisits regional integration schemes and analyzes whether Africa can
use them in linking the African continent with rapidly globalizing world markets. Following the
discussion of the new motives for RTAs in Section 2.4.3, this section of the paper first reviews
economic reasons for regional integration. Then it concentrates on the developments in South-
South trade. First, a set of qualitative arguments for and against a leveraged expansion of South-
South trade are reviewed. Historical facts related to geographical integration of the South’s trade
are presented. Analyses in this part of the paper suggest that development of regional gravity and
of complementarity are the prerequisites for sustained South-South trade integration. Openness
developed through liberalization efforts, and alleviation of import capacity (foreign exchange
holdings) through capital inflows support the South’s trade integration in line with economic gravity
and complementarity. Any institutional frameworks that redirect trade flows against these economic
forces should reduce the level and benefits of trade integration. Developing countries should gain
more from universal expansion of trade (both South-North and South-South) than from narrower
policy-driven trade integration (South-South RTAs). The section 4.2 concludes with the discussion
of regional integration schemes in the African context. There this paper argues the ways in which
Africa should utilize regional integration schemes in linking itself to global markets.
Rationale for Regional Integration
In Section 2.4.2, static benefits and costs of regional integration schemes such as  regional
trading arrangements (RTAs) were discussed. Viner’s static analysis of a customs union compares
trade creation (positive) effects and trade diversion (negative) effects (Viner, 1950). Trade creation
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efficient producer/exporter in a member country of an RTA. Trade diversion and resulting welfare
losses occur as a less efficient producer/exporter in a member country in an RTA replaces a more
efficient producer/exporter in a non-member country as a result of an RTA formation. Net welfare
gains/losses are therefore determined by the relative sizes of trade creation and diversion.
Dynamic effects of an RTA are, however, more important and dominant in the long run. New
motives for RTAs presented in Section 2.4.3 lead to dynamic gains through an expectation-
augmented process of industrial agglomeration and through productivity growth supported by
inflows of FDI.
Lyakurwa, McKay, Ng’eco and Kennes (1997) enumerate the sources of dynamic gains
drawn as a consequence of a larger regional unified market under regional integration schemes.
• The larger market offers greater possibilities for the exploitation of economies of scale.
• Integration is likely to lead to increased competition within the union, with consequent
efficiency benefits.
• There is an impact on capital formation, possibly through several channels: reduction on
barriers to diffusion, technology transfer, externalities from export growth, increased
marginal product of capital.
• The union members, acting as a group, may be more able to influence the terms of trade
they face.
When this paper discussed the reasons why Africa had been marginalized in the global
economy (Section 3.2), Krugman’s notion of low-level equilibrium traps in endogenous growth
models and his arguments on the positive effects of concentration were introduced (Krugman,
1991). There are two types of economies of scale: those external to the individual firm, and those
internalized within the firm in the production and supply of inputs as agglomeration proceeds. A
formation of an RTA may work as a trigger for this process of concentration by providing a
market with a critical mass.
Arguments for South-South Trade, South-South RTAs
Arguments favoring South-South trade can be made under both inward-oriented and outward-
oriented development schemes. Under an inward-oriented development scheme, South-South
trade is promoted to lessen the South’s dependence on the dominant North. It is argued that the
South’s export structure is bound to be marginalized toward lower-technology, lower-value primary
commodities in its trade with the North. For instance, Greenaway and Milner (1990) introduce
the term ‘comparative-advantage pessimism’ for an extreme belief on the part of the South that
many of the economies in the South do not have an advantage in anything if compared with the
North. As a result, the South becomes highly dependent on imports of higher-technology capital
and other manufactured goods from the North, with inevitable worsening in terms of trade against
the South. Institutional redirection of the South’s trade flows or protection of the domestic ‘infant
industries’ are thus regarded as necessary to break this vicious cycle and to build ‘self-reliance’
(Amsden, 1987).
Related to this infant industry argument, proponents of South-South trade (at the expense of
North-South trade) stress the need for the South to develop externalities or economies of scale to
break into the North’s manufactures markets.
Stewart (1984) presents a ‘technology terms of trade’ argument for an expansion of South-
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for the South to catch up in this area. In addition, the production processes and finished products
involving new technologies originating in the North are often inappropriate for the South’s factor
endowments and patterns of consumption. In this context, an expansion of South-South trade
could encourage development of technology more suitable for the South.
Structuralist arguments for an expansion of South-South trade lead to a more ‘equitable
distribution of the fruits of trade.’ North-South trade is seen to result in an asymmetric distribution
of the gains from trade due to stronger bargaining power and monopolistic price settings on the
part of the North, and to terms of trade unfavorable to the South (Palma, 1989).
A visible slowdown in the North’s trend of growth in imports, as well as a rise in protectionist
sentiments on the part of the North in the 1970s and early 1980s called into question the sustainability
of the South’s dependence on the expansion of the North’s import markets for its growth. Arthur
Lewis (1970), who viewed trade with the North as an engine for growth in the South, argued for
a policy-driven expansion in South-South trade in order to fill the gap created by the slowdown in
the North’s import growth. Bhagwati (1988), following Lewis’s export pessimism, termed the
arguments for an expansion of South-South trade in light of increased protectionism on the part of
the North’s markets the ‘second export pessimism.’ 7
These last two arguments for an expansion of South-South trade, however, left an open-
ended question. Could South-South trade be transformed from its traditional marginal role to
become a major element in the economies of the South, one which could create the needed degree
of dynamism to help carry the South to new heights of economic achievement? (Maizels, 1993)
Arguments against Leveraged South-South Trade
The past failures in narrowly formed inward-looking RTAs were presented in Section 2.4 of
the paper. Arguments against policy-leveraged formation of trading areas stem, by and large, from
the adverse effects of forced trade redirection on the efficiency of resource allocation, in both the
global and regional context. These arguments use the Heckscher-Ohlin trade framework of factor
endowments as their theoretical base. Krueger (1978) argues that since developing countries are
relatively well endowed with (unskilled) labor and are relatively short of capital, trade with other
developing countries with similar factor endowments is likely to increase the imbalances in factor
availability, whereas trade with industrial countries may serve as a means of exchanging abundant
factors for scarce ones.
Relative factor endowments as a determining factor of trade flows are supported by empirical
studies, such as that by Deardorff (1984). Geenaway and Milner (1987) reviewed empirical
evidence on North-South trade and found equally strong relevance of factor endowments to direction
of trade. The Heckscher-Ohlin framework will continue to supply a theoretical background for
inter-industry trade among economies with dissimilar endowments.
For the success of trade among economies with similar factor endowments, intra-industry
transactions should evolve. The similarity thesis, known as the Linder thesis, asserts that convergence
in income levels should promote trade in similar but differentiated goods, that is, intra-industry
trade (Linder, 1961). Results from empirical studies on the Linder thesis such as those by
Havrylyshyn and Civan (1985), however, suggest that developments in per capita income, a certain
size of economy, and similarities in demand structure are prerequisites for growth in the intra-
industry segment of trade flows. Intra-industry trade is also widely believed to require economies
of scale for its growth. This, in turn, requires a market large enough for each differentiated good
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intra-industry flows among the South’s economies is fairly limited for now, except for a few cases
such as the trade among NIEs in Asia.
Analyses of trade (particularly exports) as an engine for growth assert (or implicitly assume)
that trade with a high-income, high-technology area entails higher ‘learning effects’ and ‘knowledge
and technology spillover,’ resulting in higher induced productivity growth on the part of developing
countries. This argument naturally favors South-North trade over South-South transactions (World
Bank, 1993: Ch. 6). This is a most prominent counterargument against the ‘technology terms of
trade’ argument that favors South-South trade.
Developments in South-South Trade as a Byproduct of North-South Integration8
By analyzing movements in the ratios of trade to GDP (in constant US$) in both developed
and developing regions over the past two decades, Otsubo (1996a) finds that there has been a
marked evolution in the process of global trade integration. Otsubo (1996b) asserts that the upward
kink in global integration observed in the mid-1980s was the product of at least three factors:
dissipation of protectionist sentiment among OECD economies as manifested in the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, the expansion of the EU, and eventually in the success of the GATT
Uruguay Round; waves of unilateral liberalization on the part of the South’s economies in order to
take part more vigorously in the dynamically globalizing world market; and the revival of capital
flows into the South after the debt crisis of the 1980s, which alleviated the South’s foreign exchange
shortages and import capacity limitations. Given this resurgence in trade integration, which partly
alleviated the fear related to ‘export pessimism,’ this section of the paper presents developments
over the decade since the mid-1980s in South-South regional and subregional trade flows, in the
level of complementarity, and in trade connections among the South’s geographical regions.9
World trade has grown by 7 percent per year on average during the decade since the mid-
1980s (1985-94). In the North-South breakdown, South-South trade has grown fastest, at an
average rate of 12.1 percent per year. The South’s countries increased their exports to the North’s
markets at a rate of 10.2 percent per year, while providing markets for the North’s exporters that
expanded by 8.9 percent per year. Intra-North trade was the only segment that grew more slowly
than total world trade, confirming the increased contribution of the South’s economies to the
increments in world trade that has been observed since the mid-1980s. During the same period,
the prices of the North’s merchandise exports increased at an average rate of 4.1 percent per
year, while prices of the South’s merchandise exports increased at an annual rate of only 1.4
percent. Thus, measured in constant dollar terms, the increased presence of the South’s merchandise
in the markets of the North is even more striking.
Trade in manufactures has been the most dynamic segment of growing world trade in the past
decade. The share of manufactures in the South’s exports to the North increased from 45 percent
in 1985 to 72 percent in 1994, and within South-South trade, the manufactures’ share rose from
56 percent to 75 percent. Less than 10 percent of this shift to manufactures’ exports can be
attributed to relative price changes favoring manufactures.
The dominant dynamics of manufactures trade were visible in most of the South’s intra-
regional trade transactions. Except for Europe and Central Asia (ECA), where industrial production
shrank rapidly with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and for the Middle East and North Africa
(MNA), where oil production continued to dominate total output, intra-regional trade was propelled
by transactions in manufactured goods. Manufactures share of intra-regional trade almost doubled
in sub-Saharan Africa’s intra-regional trade during the period of 1985-94. Sub-Saharan Africa’s50 Shigeru Otsubo
share was close to that of East Asia in 1994, where manufactures intra-industry trade had been
rapidly increasing along with the evolving production network propelled by foreign direct investment.
This shows a potential for trade transactions among similar monoculture (concentrated primary
commodity exporting) neighbors once these economies succeed in moving into labor-intensive,
material-oriented manufactures—such as wood products, and processed and differentiated food
products—that meet the needs of consumers with similar (lower per capita) income levels. In this
context, the export identification programs, such as those operated through World Bank/UNDP,
have a potential for success in Africa. The dominance of manufacturing in incremental intra-regional
trade still holds, even measured in constant dollar terms. For instance, out of a more than a 90
percent increase in manufactures in the trade bundle of sub-Saharan Africa’s intra-regional trade
during 1985-1994, only about 15 percent of the increase was attributable to changes in relative
prices favoring manufactured goods.
A wave of liberalization—often unilateral—has led to a more efficient distribution of productive
resources spurring both South-North and South-South trade. The reduction and elimination of
distortionary trade policies such as export redirection, export subsidies, import tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, have enabled developing countries to gradually shift concentration of production
into goods where they have a comparative advantage. During the past decade of liberalization, the
direction of exports from every southern region has become more in line with its natural
complementarity with trading partners (a countries’ export items match the import items of their
trading partners), suggesting gains in distributional efficiency.
Figure 18 introduces the growth of the South’s intra-regional trade (in nominal terms) and
regional outputs (in constant dollar terms), accumulated net private resource inflows, and levels
and developments in complementarity in intra-regional trade transactions during 1985-1993. Intra-
regional trade has grown rapidly in East Asia and Latin America (average annual rates of 22
percent and 16 percent respectively). Starting from a very small base, it has also grown in South
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (average annual rates of 8.9 percent and 8.1 percent
respectively). In Europe and Central Asia on the other hand, intra-regional trade has shrunk at a
rate of 21 percent per annum.  There was virtually no growth in intra-regional transactions in
Middle East and North Africa during the same period.
Economic gravity and its dynamism have been primarily responsible for developments in
intra-regional trade. These developments have also been affected by resource flows that augment
import capacity, and the levels and developments in trade complementarity. In 1993, regional
complementarity in trade bundles was highest in Europe, Central Asia, and East Asia, followed by
Latin America (LAC). Intra-regional trade complementarity was lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Studies of the South’s trade performance including the one by Maizels (1993), often suggest
that foreign exchange shortages, lack of availability of trade-related credits, and the resulting
squeeze in import capacity have been the obstacles to the South’s trade integration, and in particular,
South-South integration. Regarding one of these obstacles, import-purchase effects (the alleviation
of import capacity) have been a primary area of positive effects of exports on growth (Esfahani,
1991). Otsubo (1996b), using Granger causality tests between levels of reserves and nominal
import values (goods and services), shows that import capacity tends to be strongly binding in
Latin America (LAC), South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Europe and Central Asia
(ECA), and mildly binding in Middle East and North Africa (MNA).10 The size of net long-term
resource inflow is a strong determinant of import demand for the regions with binding import
capacities.Linking Africa to a Changing World 51
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Complementarity index is calculated as:
where i is an exporting region, j is an importing region, and k represents goods categories.
Figure 18: South’s Intra-Regional Trade and Economic Forces of Connection, 1985-1993
Source:  Otsubo (1995).
The collapse in intra-regional trade in Eastern Europe was due almost entirely to the collapse
in output. However, with transition proceeding rapidly, trade complementarity is expected to
increase, leading to revived intra-regional transactions. In sub-Saharan Africa, low intra-regional
trade complementarity, scarce resources, and relatively stagnant output growth have kept the size
of intra-regional transactions small. In Latin America, although financial resources continued to be
a restraining factor, a resurgence of capital flows after the dissipation of the debt crisis allowed
higher import levels and thus contributed to the growth of intra-regional trade. To date, Asia is the
only region in the South where the share of intra-regional trade in total trade has been increasing—
from less than 20 percent in the mid-1970s to almost 40 percent in 1994.52 Shigeru Otsubo
Implications drawn here, and the fact that East Asia has been the region most integrated with
the North followed by Latin America, suggest that trade integration has been proceeding and
should continue to proceed in line with these economic forces of connection. Given that economic
gravity, supply of capital, and the complementarity for trade with dissimilar factor endowments
(inter-industry trade) lie in the North’s markets and some of the South’s most advanced markets,
the South’s connection and integration through trade should proceed by utilizing these advanced
and/or dynamic markets. As the South develops its own markets and attains a certain degree of
maturity in its expenditure patterns, trade based on similarity (intra-industry trade) should naturally
flow. Therefore, ‘policy-driven’ forced integration among southern regions should not be regarded
as the South’s entry point toward global integration. An open trade framework that accelerates
the South’s integration with the North will encourage developments in South-South trade if applied
universally.
Regional Integration in African Context
The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980 sought to promote Africa’s long-term industrialization
and development through the creation of larger, sub-regional markets and, eventually, of a continent-
wide market through their subsequent merging (Konings and Meilink, 1998). The LPA divided
Sub-Saharan Africa into three sub-regions: West Africa, Central Africa, and Eastern and Southern
Africa. Each of the sub-regions was to go through the stages of integration before an African
common market could be formed (Lyakurwa, McKay, Ng’eco and Kennes, 1997). West Africa
was covered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in
1975), which actually pre-dated the LPA, and served as a model for other sub-regional integration
schemes under the LPA. Eastern and Southern Africa was served by the Preferential Trade Area
(PTA), established in 1981. The PTA was superseded by the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1993. The Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), approved in 1983, was to serve Central Africa. Together with the Arab Maghreb
Union (AMU), established in 1989, these arrangements were expected to form an all-African
common market by the year 2000. However, none of these LPA schemes achieved their integration
target. They were overly ambitious, too politically and not sufficiently economically-oriented, and
did not address, in a sufficient manner, the varying economic needs of the member states.
Outside the LPA framework, Konings and Meilink (1998) depict two important regional
integration schemes that are associated with the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc:
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) formed within the ambit of ECOWAS,
and the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) formed within the geographical
area of ECCAS. Participating members of UEMOA and of CEMAC share common central banks,
the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), and the Bank of Central African States
(BEAC), respectively. Within the ambit of COMESA, there are two regional integration schemes:
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), with an associated monetary union, the Common
Monetary Area (CMA); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). As shown
in Table 10, SACU is a unique regional integration scheme in Africa, with South Africa, Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland as members, operating as a customs union with common external
tariffs. The SADC started in 1992 as an evolution from the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was established in 1980. The Community aims at
cooperation on a common agenda¯issues such as security, democracy, and conflict resolution.
With South Africa gaining membership in SADC in 1994, all of the members of SACU are now
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As summarized in Table 10, although the majority of modern-day African regional integration
schemes originally aimed at formation of a common market, largely because of little or no progress
in trade liberalization, they ended up being mere meeting grounds for African heads of state to get
together and discuss regional cooperation issues. Lyakurwa, McKay, Ng’eco and Kennes (1997)
enumerate the major reasons for the failure of regional integration in developing countries in general.
Those are:
• failure to implement reduction in trade barriers;
• inability to devise fair arrangements for distributing the benefits arising from regional
integrations;
• restrictions on factor mobility;
• ineffectiveness of industrial planning, especially failure to agree on methods to distribute
industries;
• ineffectiveness of the common external tariff (CET) arising from member countries
requesting exemptions to avoid the revenue constraint;
• general failure of import substitution policies;
• lack of a strong and sustained political commitment; and
• macroeconomic instability.
Most of these failing factors apply in varying degrees to Africa’s past unsuccessful regional
integration initiatives. Also, Collier’s ‘insufficient scale’ argument applies to the failure of African
regional integration initiatives (Collier, 1995). In addition, cross-memberships and overlapping
schemes are characteristic of Africa’s regional integration schemes. This duplication of functions
and multiple memberships create a great deal of confusion and contribute to the lack of policy
consistency. Moreover, Africa does not have sufficient infrastructure such as transportation and
telecommunication services to support intra-regional trade transactions. Finally, Konings and
Meilink (1998) assert that Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) work against regional
integration in general as the programmes are typically nationally oriented. Unilateral liberalization
of imports that SAPs often require tends to invite cheap imports from outside the region and
destroys the region’s industrial base for intra-regional trade.
Ultimately, the economic situation, resource endowments, and structure of comparative
advantage in African economies may not be conducive to a formation of intra-regional trade. In
the preceding section, it was shown that low intra-regional trade complementarity, scarce resources,
and relatively stagnant output growth have kept the size of sub-Saharan Africa’s intra-regional
transactions small. Global Economic Prospects 1996 compares trade complementarity indices,
computed in the same way as those presented in Figure 18, for selected trade arrangements
(World Bank, 1995: Box 1-3). For successful arrangements, computed indices of trade
complementarity are relatively high: 0.53 for EEC6, 0.64 for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area,
and 0.56 for NAFTA. Indices for recent/potential arrangements of Mercosur and APEC are 0.29
and 0.35, respectively. For unsuccessful arrangements, computed indices are relatively low: 0.22
for the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and 0.07 for the Andean Pact. For 20
sub-Saharan African countries where reliable data can be extracted from UN/COMTRADE, the
value of the computed index of complementarity is only 0.09. As Konings and Meilink (1998)
note, many of the African economies are producing the same range of primary commodities exported
to the industrialized countries, leaving little room for trade among themselves. World Bank (1989)
shows that only 6 percent of total sub-Saharan Africa’s exports (in officially-recorded trade) is
intra-regional trade.54 Shigeru Otsubo
Foroutan (1993) supports this argument of ineffectiveness. Evaluating Sub-Saharan Africa’s
experience with trade integration, he states that none of the groupings besides SACU have achieved
any noticeable degree of integration in their goods markets. Intra-Sub-Saharan-Africa exports
are mainly composed of manufactures whereas exports to the rest of the world are principally
composed of primary commodities. He therefore asserts that trade integration among Sub-Saharan-
African countries could be effective if they satisfy the conditions for intra- or inter-industry trade.
If these conditions are not satisfied, then the limited extent of trade among Sub-Saharan-African
countries cannot be attributed to the ‘failure’ of integration schemes, but rather to their
ineffectiveness. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) try to test for any possible gap between potential
and actual trade among countries in sub-Saharan-Africa using a gravity model of trade. The results
show that although countries in sub-Saharan Africa on average trade too little with the world as a
whole, their bilateral trade flows (i.e., intra-regional trade flows) do not fall below what the model
predicts. The existing natural economic forces in sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, are not conducive
to an increase in intra-regional trade, regardless of regional integration schemes.
Africa continues to place great hope in regional integration schemes despite repeated past
failures of such schemes and the unfavorable economic forces of intra-regional connection. Konings
and Meilink (1998) state that confronted by what they perceive as an increasingly hostile international
environment and the severe crisis of African economies, African heads of state recently reaffirmed
their commitment to regional integration. In their meeting at Kampala in May 1991, they concluded
that the only viable way out of the development crisis facing Africa was the redoubling of efforts
towards early, effective continental integration. Therefore, a viable question here is: how can and
should Africa utilize regional integration schemes in linking itself to global markets?
Having reviewed the negative factors underlying past failed African regional integration schemes
and the positive factors underlying partially successful schemes such as SADCC, UDEAC, and
regional central banks, this paper now enumerates conditions for Africa to utilize regional integration
initiatives in order to link the continent to a changing global economy.
(1)  Africa should aim at North-South integration with a more open trade framework.
From the analyses presented in Section 4.2.4, conclusions are drawn that a ‘policy-driven’
forced integration among southern regions should not be regarded as the South’s entry point
toward global integration. An open trade framework that accelerates the South’s integration with
the North’s markets will encourage developments in South-South trade if applied universally.
NAFTA, a North-South integration scheme, worked as ‘agencies of restraint’ for Mexico, and
provided ‘insurance’ for international investors by locking in trade and domestic reforms. As a
result, Mexico has become a favorite FDI destination of not only North American MNEs but also
of Japanese and European MNEs. Association with the EU similarly provides more credible
agencies of restraint for Africa than intra-African schemes can provide by themselves (Collier,
1995). Collier and Gunning (1995) state that Africa’s participation in a North-South type of trading
arrangement would enhance the policy credibility of the region in three ways by: 1) locking in its
policy reforms; 2) generating higher domestic and foreign investment both though increased policy
credibility and hence reduced risk of policy reversals; and 3) ensuring more secure and permanent
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(2) Use regional integration/cooperation schemes for the African continent in order to
benefit more from the Association Agreements with the EU.
Africa should utilize regional cooperation schemes and cross-border initiatives (CBIs) to
diffuse and maximize benefits obtained by Morocco, Tunisia, and South Africa, through the
Association Agreements with the EU. Africa’s lack of sufficient infrastructure such as transportation
and telecommunication services to support intra-regional trade transactions hindered a successful
formation of regional integration schemes in the past. Working on these sectoral development
agenda as CBIs will automatically help to diffuse the benefits from the Association Agreements to
a wider area of the African continent. Future negotiations with the EU could also be effectively
carried out by sub-regional integration schemes on the part of Africa (Oyejide, 1998).
(3) Past integration schemes built on inward-looking ISI strategies should be replaced
by export-promoting outward-oriented open regional schemes.
Members of the past African regional integration schemes continued to exercise import
substitution industrialization strategies even within the regional framework. Even if a regional free
market could have been established, regional-level import substitution policies would have failed
due to ‘insufficient scale’ in Africa’s regional markets. As described in Section 3, African policy
makers should overcome their general skepticism about the value of integration and stop the
process of marginalization/delinking from the global markets in order to form a virtuous cycle of
integration and growth. The problem lies on the part of Africa in its restrictive import (openness)
and export policies.
(4) Use regional integration schemes in order to capitalize on the new motives and
lock-in reform agenda.
This paper sees potential for the regional arrangements backed by the new ‘deep integration,’
‘safe haven,’ ‘insurance,’ and ‘buy out’ motives, as they support the advancement of complementary
domestic reforms as well as reforms at the border. Otsubo (1998) stresses the importance of
complementary domestic reforms, geared to increase domestic supply response, for member
countries to enjoy possible benefits (welfare gains) from a membership in a regional trading
arrangement. Using computable general equilibrium analyses of regional trading arrangements (RTAs)
in the APEC region, Otsubo concludes that an elimination of distortions in domestic sectoral terms
of trade, through domestic reforms such as an elimination of domestic commodity taxes/subsidies,
is unambiguously conducive to welfare gains, through improvements in international terms of trade
and in allocative efficiency of productive resources. This type of domestic reform can and should
be introduced irrespective of the international economic environment as it unambiguously provides
positive welfare implications. If a formation of a regional integration scheme facilitates domestic
reforms thanks to the ‘buy out’ motive, the economic consequences of a membership through this
channel are clearly positive. Nevertheless, Africa’s domestic market conditions may simply not
warrant any success in regional integration, unless domestic reform agenda introduced in Section
4.1 are properly addressed. Foroutan (1993) mentions the case of UDEAC where a regional
integration framework could play an important role in facilitating badly-needed economic reform—
a far-reaching reform of member countries’ trade and indirect tax regimes.56 Shigeru Otsubo
(5) Use regional schemes, including monetary unions and CBIs, as agencies of restraint.
Closely related to item (4), regional integration schemes can be used to reduce perceived
risk and pool resources in order to draw more international investment, FDI in particular. Integration
schemes backed by the ‘deep integration’, ‘insurance’, and ‘buy out’ motives often provide stronger
‘agencies of restraint’ conducive to lower investment risks. This item also relates to item (1) in the
sense that North-South schemes provide more credible ‘agencies of restraint’ than South-South
initiatives can offer. In this context, Collier (1995) compares Mexico in NAFTA with Uganda
itself or in the PTA. Collier (1995) also points out that regional central banks, if linked to the
European Union, can provide credible agencies of restraint with respect to fiscal and exchange
rate policy, and thus reduce risks associated with investment in the regions.
(6) Shift in strategy from grand market-integration schemes to more regional/sectoral
cooperation and to cross-border initiatives (CBIs) for now, as a step toward more formal
market integration in the long run.
A growing number of scholars advise African leaders to adopt a more realistic and flexible
approach to regional integration which views market integration, such as a common market, as a
long-term goal (McCarthy, 1995; World Bank, 1989). As shown earlier, the economic situation,
resource endowments, and structure of comparative advantage in African economies may not be
conducive to a formation of intra-regional trade. It appears unlikely that complete trade and factor
market integration is any more feasible today or in the near future than it has been in the past.
Cooperation, coordination, and harmonization hold greater promise (Foroutan, 1993). The
SADCC-SADC, as one of the most successful regional integration schemes in Africa, is a good
example of such an approach. It promoted regional cooperation in the form of sectoral development,
sponsoring, for example, project cooperation in sectors such as transport and communications,
water and electricity (Konings and Meilink, 1998).
(7) Emphasize regional/sectoral cooperation and CBIs to reduce transport costs for
exporters.
As discussed in Section 3.2, transport costs influence the location decisions of MNEs.
However, due to Africa being in a low-level trap with little manufacturing located in the continent,
firms there cannot reap the positive effects of agglomeration. Global Economic Prospects 1996
cites high transport costs as an obstacle on the path to trade integration (World Bank, 1996).
Sachs (1996) states that to the extent that foreign investors can help provide infrastructure in
telecommunications, port facilities and power, African governments themselves should typically
focus on road-building, especially roads to connect rural areas to national markets and international
ports. This is especially vital in Africa, where much export-led growth should come from smallholder
agriculture¯such as cotton in the Sahel, tea in Kenya, tobacco in Malawi¯which is often located in
rather remote areas. Africa, with 15 of 53 countries landlocked, should deal with road-building in
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(8) Sort out overlapping regional integration schemes and discontinue multiple
memberships in integration arrangements.
Duplication of functions and multiple memberships create a great deal of confusion and
contribute to the lack of policy consistency, and give rise to conflicting interests, thus hindering
advancement of regional integration initiatives. With a scarce pool of administrators, experts in
legal affairs, and accountants, duplicative administrative costs of integration schemes cannot be
ignored. Resources should be effectively allocated by increasing coordination between non-
overlapping regional integration schemes and institutions. The role of coordinator should be played
by such institutions as OAU, ECA, and the African Development Bank.
(9) Use regional schemes as a forum for knowledge management and dissemination.
Africa should utilize regional schemes in order to accumulate and share successful experiences
of integration, and to discuss coordination both at factor and goods levels in order to mitigate the
continent’s resource constraint and ‘adding-up’ problems. Again, institutions such as OAU, ECA,
and the African Development Bank should help in the coordination.
(10) Utilize regional integration/cooperation schemes in order for African countries to
 participate more actively in global multilateral negotiations such as the WTO process.
Given the potentially large benefits to African economies of the WTO Millennium Round,
which includes the liberalization of agricultural trade in the built-in agenda, active participation in
the process of the Round is highly desirable for Africa (Section 2.3). African membership in the
WTO is impressive. Virtually all African countries are members. Of the 29 LDC members of the
WTO, 24 are from the African continent. However, as Oyejide (1998) notes, their bargaining
power is quite weak, and they have usually not acted in concert to defend their common interests.
If each country acts independently for its own interests, a huge total of highly educated and trained
human resources is required. As African economies often cannot independently afford these
resources, regional cooperation and coordination within the WTO negotiating process has high
promise.
For Africa to select a viable strategy of utilizing regional integration schemes as a ticket to its
integration into the global markets, the WTO should accommodate Africa’s initiatives in its new
revised rules or through preferential treatments. Oyejide (1998) discusses the possibility of replacing
the existing GSP scheme and removal of the exclusivity of the preference structure under the
Lomé Convention by instituting a new WTO preferential scheme, where preferences are given to
qualified beneficiary countries defined by a certain level of per capita income and/or manufactured
content in export bundles. Preferences should be given with a certain time limit in order to avoid
permanent ‘free-riders’. There are counter arguments to the continuous preferential treatment of
developing countries in the GATT/WTO processes. Proponents of non-preferential treatment assert
that given that the majority of developing countries should eventually benefit from negotiations
such as the liberalization of agricultural trade, developing country members should also be equally
treated in terms of obligations.
Reviewing a possible new agenda for the WTO Millennium Round in Section 2.3, this paper
stated: “The WTO should work to ensure that RTAs are complementary to the WTO’s goal of
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developing countries manifested in the increasing number of memberships, many developing
countries may regard regional integration schemes as a key to the global economy and to the
negotiations at the global, multilateral level. If so, a careful, time-framed preferential treatment for
the developing countries might be necessary for WTO-friendly regional integration initiatives.”
It is most likely that a certain rule-based time-framed preferential treatment will be instituted
in the framework of the WTO, governing preferential treatments of both individual developing
countries and regional integration schemes in developing regions. One should note however,
regardless of the developments in the WTO negotiations, utilizing more sectoral coordination and
cross-border initiatives (CBIs) to address the bottlenecks hindering Africa’s linkage to the global
markets is more in line with the GATT/WTO principle, and is a more practical choice for Africa in
the foreseeable future.
Concluding Remarks
This paper is provided in order to make policy suggestions for Africa’s re-engagement in the
global markets moving toward the 21st century. Strategies of integration were to be considered
both at national borders and within domestic economies. In linking African economies to a rapidly
globalizing and sometimes volatile world economy, the possible role of regional integration schemes,
and strategies to draw foreign direct investments (FDIs) were presented and evaluated with
forward-looking policy suggestions.
This paper first reviewed the changing economic environment under globalization.
Globalization, defined as the integration of production, distribution, and use of goods and services
among the economies of the world, has been manifested at a factor level in the increasing flows of
capital and labor, and at the product level in resounding growth in world trade above and beyond
the growth of world output. In the last decade, international trade in goods and services has grown
twice as fast as global output. In the same period, developing countries as a whole have increasingly
assumed a larger role in world trade with their share climbing from 23 to almost 30 percent. Also,
developing regions claimed 30 percent of global FDI stock in 1997. The relocation and integration
of production processes across national borders has been reinforced by increasing flows of private
capital, especially in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), which is often associated with
global production strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Another key feature of the current
globalization is a rapid expansion in service trade. Due to the revolution in information technology
(IT) and declining transportation costs, service-supplying enterprises and service-demanding
consumers engage more and more in cross-border transactions.
The paper recognized the clear failures of past inward-looking regional integration schemes
that were often formed without economic gravity, and discussed motives for new outward-oriented
regional trading arrangements. The paper sees potential for the regional arrangements backed by
the new “deep integration,” “safe haven,” “insurance,” and “buy out” motives, as they support the
advancement of complementary domestic reforms as well as reforms at the border. Analyses of
the driving factors of the South’s (geographical) regional integration in the past showed that economic
gravity such as economic dynamism, supply of capital, and complementarity had been the key for
regional integration. As this economic gravity often lies in the North’s markets, open trade
frameworks that connect the South with the North were recommended. Among the regional trading
frameworks, general superiority of North-South arrangements over South-South arrangements
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The successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round underpins the heightened prospects
for further integration by improving market access and securing an environment conducive to
integration. Liberalization of agricultural trade that was brought up in the previous round and
negotiations on service trade are the so-called built-in agenda for the Millennium Round. As such,
the Round will present great opportunities for developing countries, and will at the same time call
for active participation on the part of developing countries including those in Africa.
Africa has been gradually but steadily marginalized in the rapidly globalizing world economy
in the last quarter of the 20th century. The marginalization of Africa is visible in its shares of exports,
output, and private capital inflows in the world and in the developing community. The only
international economic dimension in which Africa has not become marginal is aid. Africa’s trend of
marginalization in the global economy represents a process of delinking from the world economy.
Given that trade integration and economic growth are simultaneous achievements in many successful
integrators of Asia, and that industrial countries have been wide open to Africa’s exports relative
to those from other regions, it can safely be said that Africa’s largely self-imposed exile from
world markets can and should end by liberalizing trade. In order to stop and reverse the process
of Africa’s marginalization in the global economy, Africa should also work on a wider range of
reform agenda on top of trade liberalization, such as creation of an investment-friendly institutional
environment.
In linking Africa to a changing and globalizing world, this paper reviewed reform agenda and
evaluated the possible role of regional integration schemes. In order for a country to successfully
cope with and take advantage of rapidly globalizing world markets, it has to work on reform
agenda both at the border and in the domestic market. The current wave of globalization proceeds
mainly in four spheres: goods and services transactions, financial transactions, labor movements,
and corporate activities. Therefore, if it wishes to successfully integrate into the global economy, a
country must reform systems and structures pertaining to these spheres of economic activities in
search of a stable, transparent, and fair market system with efficient and proper government
involvement. Strategies and policy initiatives were enumerated in relation to markets (goods,
services, capital, and labor markets) and economic agents (government, producers, consumers,
and foreign economies). However, these reform strategies for integration work well if and only if
they are supported by stable and predictable policies. Frequent and abrupt policy reversals prevalent
in many African economies prohibit any advancement in the continent’s integration into the global
financial markets.
Africa continues to place great hope in regional integration schemes despite repeated past
failures of such schemes and the unfavorable economic forces of intra-regional connection. In
fact, confronted by what they perceive as an increasingly hostile international environment and the
severe crisis of African economies, African heads of state recently reaffirmed their commitment to
regional integration. How can and should Africa utilize regional integration schemes in linking itself
to global markets? In answering this question of crucial concern to Africa, this paper enumerated
conditions for Africa to successfully utilize regional integration initiatives for said purpose. Ten
suggestions made in this context are as follows:
1. Africa should aim at North-South integration with a more open trade framework.
2. Use regional integration/cooperation schemes for the African continent in order to benefit
more from the Association Agreements with the EU.
3. Past integration schemes built on inward-looking ISI strategies should be replaced by
export-promoting outward-oriented open regional schemes.
4. Use regional integration schemes in order to capitalize on the new motives and lock-in
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5. Use regional schemes, including monetary unions and CBIs, as agencies of restraint.
6. Shift in strategy from grand market-integration schemes to more regional/sectoral
cooperation and to cross-border initiatives (CBIs) for now, as a step toward more formal
market integration in the long run.
7. Emphasize regional/sectoral cooperation and CBIs to reduce transport costs for exporters.
8. Sort out overlapping regional integration schemes and discontinue multiple memberships
in integration arrangements.
9. Use regional schemes as a forum for knowledge management and dissemination.
10. Utilize regional integration/cooperation schemes in order for African countries to
participate more actively in global multilateral negotiations such as the WTO process.
Most importantly, whether it be domestic/border reform or regional integration initiatives, as
they work on strategies in order to reverse the course from de-linking and marginalization into
linking and re-engagement, and to form a virtuous cycle of integration and growth, African leaders
should always bear in mind that it is Africa’s course of action that determines future relations
between African economies and the global markets.
Notes and References
1. 1993 was the year when intra-European trade collapsed due to recession.
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